

Sulista et al., 2019

Volume 5 Issue 3, pp. 275-296

Date of Publication: 11<sup>th</sup> December 2019

DOI- <https://dx.doi.org/10.20319/pijss.2019.53.275296>

This paper can be cited as: Sulista, S., Ibrahim, I., & Pratama, S., (2019). Accommodation, Resistance and Divided Community: Study of the Dynamics of Offshore Tin Mining Conflict between the Fishermen of the Coastal Area and Companies in Bangka Island. *PEOPLE: International Journal of Social Sciences*, 5(3), 275-296.

This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial 4.0 International License. To view a copy of this license, visit <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/> or send a letter to Creative Commons, PO Box 1866, Mountain View, CA 94042, USA.

## **ACCOMMODATION, RESISTANCE AND DIVIDED COMMUNITY: STUDY OF THE DYNAMICS OF OFFSHORE TIN MINING CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FISHERMEN OF THE COASTAL AREA AND COMPANIES IN BANGKA ISLAND**

**Sulista Sulista**

*Regional Development Planning and Research Advancement Agency, Bangka Belitung Islands  
Province, Indonesia*  
[sulista.25051986@gmail.com](mailto:sulista.25051986@gmail.com)

**Ibrahim Ibrahim**

*Political Science Department, Bangka Belitung University, Bangka Belitung Islands Province,  
Indonesia*  
[iim\\_babel@yahoo.com](mailto:iim_babel@yahoo.com)

**Sandy Pratama**

*Political Science Department, Bangka Belitung University, Bangka Belitung Islands Province,  
Indonesia*  
[sandy\\_djarib@yahoo.co.id](mailto:sandy_djarib@yahoo.co.id)

---

### **Abstract**

*During fifteen years, the tin mining in Bangka Island has becoming more intensive and hold by the mining business licence holders. Although already has permit, it doesn't mean that the mining activity can be undergo for it is also the place for the local fishermen doing their business. The purpose of this study is to obtain the conflict dynamics and also the motive of the community's attitude toward the mining activity. The research methodology was carried out by focus group discussions with affected community groups and in-depth interviews with local leaders and*

*village/urban village government officials which were further analyzed exploratively. The results of the analysis show that there are 3 models of community response to tin mining aggression in the territorial waters of Bangka, which are accommodating, rejecting with a strong pattern of resistance, and multiple attitudes towards people who are divided in their attitudes and interests.*

### **Keywords**

Tin Mining, Motive and Form of Conflict, Access to Resources, Fishermen Group, Offshore Mine

---

## **1. Introduction**

Tin in Bangka island has been mined for 30 years, started since 1970s (Sujitno, 1996). In the beginning most of the mining activities were carried out in the mainland and a small part of the sea used dredger (KK). However, since the early 2000s, mining activities have gradually shifted to the territorial waters using The Cutter Suction Vessel (KIP). Recorded with a proportion of 58.07 percent the Mining Business Licence Area (WIUP) is located at the territorial waters consisting of 22.89 percent of the area controlled by PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk which is a State-Owned Mining Industry (BUMN) with a distance of 0-5 nautical miles and the remainder is divided under concessions of private companies with a distance of more than 5 nautical miles (Department of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2017).

Mining activities that are becoming more extensive towards intensive in the territorial waters have caused frequent turmoil between local communities and mining companies. There are 33 Operation Production Mining Business Licence Holders (IUP-OP) recorded that have applied for a temporary suspension of production operations since 2017 (Department of Energy and Mineral Resources, 2019), there were found many events which fishing communities reject the existence of KIP that will mine in coastal areas. In addition, through field surveys it was found that the impact of community rejection forced the government authorities to issue temporary cessation letters of mining activities until revoke IUP-OP. Pratama (2018) in his study said that in the case of the temporary cessation of operating KIP in Bangka Island, it was basically problematic. Sandy said that the political protest against offshore mining by non-mining community groups could indeed force the local government to make the decision to temporarily stop KIP, but this was temporary in line with the growing omission policy and tended to make government regulations less optimal. Disputes about tin natural resources were finally closed by an ironic story amid contested economic gains (Ibrahim, et al., 2018).

Conde and Le Billon (2017) revealed that the level of resistance is influenced by economic marginalization, corporate social responsibility activities, remoteness and attachment to place. Literature studies reveal that local communities react not only to perceived environmental impacts but also to their lack of representation and participation in making decision regarding their development paths, lack of monetary compensation and distrust to mining companies and the state (Conde, 2017). The assertion of the rights of affected local communities is better done in controlling the zoning, water supply, and financial benefits of mining within the scope of mining governance (Helwege, 2015). One study examining community resistance about tin mining in coastal areas was carried out on Belitung Island by Ibrahim, et al. (2019) which concluded that in the case of community rejection of tin mining in Belitung, the respondents basically agreed that offshore tin mining damaging the ecosystem, reducing the catch of fishermen, and disrupting tourism potential. Although there is a small group that agrees, the majority of people in this area declare their rejection of offshore mining. They also stated that they would continue to fight against the ongoing mining activities.

In the land area, conflict arose when the corporation's activity is face to face to the community such as using the land, impact to the environment, health impact, change of social bond among them caused by mining (Adonteng-Kissi, 2015; Opoku Mensah & Asare Okyere, 2014). Protest arose for the source of economy is getting narrower, environment impact is greater, and community conflict caused by the social recognition and social status (Bidayani, 2009; Erman, 2010, 2014; Persson, et.,al., 2017; Zulkarnain et a.l, 2005). Above all, the mining plan and the waste that might broaden in the future scared the local population regarding the lost of their culture and history, even the people's identity (Lassila, 2018) .

This study discusses how coastal communities oppose tin mining in marine areas that intersect and overlap with fishing grounds. Researchers took several locations as case studies to find governed relations and conflict maps related to offshore tin mining activities.

## **2. Research Methodology**

The research used qualitative descriptive methodology by Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with affected local groups and in-deep interview with the village apparatus. Literary study used some research articles as comparison and secondary data about the WIUP and IUP from. Besides, the researchers did direct observation towards the community dynamics around the mining area.

The research locus is Rebo Village of Bangka Regency, Matras Village of Bangka Regency, Batu Perahu Neighborhood of South Bangka Regency, and the Penganak Hamlet of West Bangka regency. Rebo and Matras Villages were chosen because there was hot conflict of offshore mining during the research. While Batu Perahu was chosen for there was a history of rejection by the local fishermen that ended in anarchy, whereas Penganak Village was chosen for it is well known as tin village where the KIP mining has been operate for long period.

Interview guidelines are formulated according to aspects and variables that want to be known starting from the choice of community attitudes, levels of resistance, and protest motives according to the results of the literature delivered in the background. Verification steps are carried out for each interrelated aspect. In the process of collecting and verifying data, recorder tools are used. The data is processed using an explanatory approach model, which is an analysis model by emphasizing the exploration of various field data and realities that are encountered as well as providing interpretations of the research object to answer formulation of the problem.

### 3. Result and Discussion


Field data proves the existence of different views from local communities in addressing the presence of mining activities in their respective regions. These attitude views can be categorized into groups that have accommodative attitudes in the Penganak and strong protest of the offshore tin mining in Batu Perahu. Whereas in Rebo and Matras, the issue have divided the community into pro-mining community groups and anti-mining community groups.

Whatever the choice of the groups, the consideration is based on economic interests both by those directly affected and those who can be said to have less interest in the economic access of the waters but then become the party most interested in because the presence of offshore mining activities. While fishermen are the community groups that have the most interest in fisheries resources. It is an irony if then one location of waters that is rich in fishery resources is the same location in which the land contains mineral reserves and is technically and economically potential to be mined.

#### 3.1 Accommodation in Penganak Hamlet, Air Gantang Village, West Bangka Regency

Penganak hamlet is the area of long history of offshore mining since early 1990s using KK under PT.Timah (Persero) Tbk's concession. In 2003, KIP came to Penganak's territorial waters which was firstly from 1 to 3 units of KIP and had become tens in 2006. During the research, there was private KIP operated in the WIUP PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk which later is called partner's

KIP and 2 unit of KIP belongs to PT. Timah itself. Above the KIP location which is now in the area of 1-2 sea miles, there are activities of fishermen catching fish. Overall, interactions among local communities, IUP owners, and KIP owners can be observed in Figure 1.



**Figure 1 :** Relationships and Access of Mining Companies and Local Communities to Tin and Marine Resources

In 2006, there was conflict between mining companies and local communities which were triggered by the economic benefits of mining activities only felt by certain parties. However, when the conflict began to flare up, the stages of socialization and negotiation were carried out by IUP holder and its partners so that the community could accept the existence of mining activities by the suction vessels (interview B, 6/28/2019). A similar case was reported by Ibrahim, et al. (2019) which conflicting community groups finally agreed to let mining activities took place based on the principle of benefit of all negotiated parties. In the case study and data collection in Penganak Hamlet, in the end some fishermen chose to become seasonal fishermen and at the same time as seasonal miners or were involved in the mining activity cycle. Finally, very few fishermen were found as fishermen and did not relate to any form of mining activity.

Even though there had been a conflict, the Penganak Community was essentially able to accept the existence of KIP because of the history that shows that KK has operated long before the reform era. In addition, after the reform period, the people of Air Gantang Village were actively

involved in mining activities, namely offshore illegal unconventional tin mining using boats or rafts composed of drums as a means of movement. Deputy Chief of the Fisherman Group said:

*"We never felt that there was a conflict. Before the existence of KIP and unconventional tin mining, PT Timah (Persero) Tbk had been operating even before I was born in the 1980s. Before 2000, the community only worked as fishermen and farmers with minimal income. However, since the early 2000s we have been able to mine through unconventional tin mining. The presence of KIP initially led to protests but after understanding the technicalities and benefits for the community, there was no longer any rejection. The presence of the unconventional mining and KIP generates benefits that can be enjoyed by the entire Community of Air Gantang Village, even some people who work as suppliers of clean water, coolies and porters "(G, 12/7/7 2019)*

In the negotiation stage, which led to an agreement, the village would get a share of the revenue from every kilo of tin obtained from the Penganak's territorial water. Head of Village (interview 28/6/2019) stated:

*"In the last 3 years since I took office, there has been no rejection from the community because the KIP. Partner's KIP contributed to the community's economy whereas the KIP owned by PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk itself does not contribute much. While in the Mineral and Coal Law (Minerba Law) states that companies operating in one region must distribute profits to the affected areas, but in reality there is no compensation distributed except cow assistance for the Muslim holiday of Eid Al-Adha which is felt to be not commensurate, while the community empowerment program which is the authority of IUP holders is not felt at all by the people of Air Gantang Village.*

It is identified from the village apparatus (interview Y, 12/7/2019), There are billions of rupiahs flows into the village treasury every year. So far, the partner's KIP are committed to the agreement. In 2017, the Village Head issued Village Head Regulation number 3 of 2017 concerning Village Community Empowerment Development Fund and Third Party Donation to guarantee legal certainty for any direct assistance taken. At the end of year, cash transfers are distributed to all communities in different proportions. In 2018, the proportion of fishermen is 200 million rupiah where every fishermen's family get a minimum of 3 million rupiah per year. While other families gets 1 million rupiah per year. The fund is also donated for religious social activities, assistance to the sick and repair to the village roads. To manage the fund and the donation, there are committee managed by the community.

Beside the economic benefits, complaints from fishermen due to environmental damage from KIP have arisen and are regarded to interfere the fishing activities. The KIP mining system is worse than KK because the mining mud spreads extends towards fishermen catching fish. The perceived impact was conveyed by the chief fisherman group (interview S, 12/7/2019), namely:

*"During mining there has been no rejection from fishermen, but actually the fishermen feel the disadvantage due to the existence of this mining activity, the fishing distance is very far,*

*usually 10 kilometers at sea, now it is very far with a distance of 4 nautical miles, dirty water mining impacts have reached 4 miles , under water was covered with mud. The catch of fishermen is less while the distance away.*

Similar statement is told by the vice chief of fishermen group (interview H, 12/7/2019):

*"The effect of mining activities on the fishing environment is extraordinary but we cannot do anything because we also feel the economic benefits. Before there was tin mining, there were quite a lot of fishing results but after there was tin mining, the catch was less and the fishing distance became further. The effect is mud that covers the seabed so that bubu (a plaited rattan fish trap) in the seabed contain mud, the coral is covered with mud. As a result, we can only fish without putting Bubu".*

From this data collection, Air Gantang Village people, especially Penganak Hamlet, can accept the existence of KIP because local communities including fishermen are also involved in tin mining activities. In addition, voluntary contributions for revenue sharing from mining activities managed by villages with legal aspects can be enjoyed by all levels of community. The aid in the amount of billions of rupiah comes from the fee for each kilogram of tin obtained by the partner's KIP recorded in the tin production data submitted to PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk. Profit sharing carried out by partner's KIP can easily be given because there are dozens of KIP in these waters so that donations can run smoothly.

Even so, it was identified that conflicts can arise considering that fishing groups began to complain and can feel the impact of the decreased economic while operational costs were increasing. There was no direct assistance from the companies that owned KIP and PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk to solve the problems encountered. even though there is, those assistance are only for certain groups of fishermen related to the dredging of sand for mooring location needs of fishermen which actually causes social jealousy among fishermen. Even though fishermen get cash assistance, but the assistance received by fishermen is considered not worth it, it can be said to be very lacking (interview informant Y, S, L, D, 7/12/2019). Direct cash assistance to villages is mandatory but fishermen are the most affected parties so that the concern of KIP owners expected to assist equipment and supplies to the needs of fishermen.

### **3.2. Resistance of Batu Perahu Neighborhood in Ketapang Village, South Bangka Regency**


Before the reformation period, mining activities had existed in Toboali's territorial waters, around the fishing zone of Batu Perahu Fishermen, using partner's KIP. At that time, some of the Batu Perahu fishermen also worked as exploration and production workers.

Apart from the history of KK's presence in these territories, in contrast to fishermen in Penganak Hamlet, Batu Perahu Fishermen reject the existence of KIP. A conflict occurred in 2014 when KIP first entered the Batu Perahu waters. The conflict dynamics can be seen in Figure 2.

The community refused the operational of KIP owned by PT. Sumber Jaya Indah (PT. SJI) operating in the area of 1.5-2 miles from the coast in 2014. The conflict heats up when fisherman protest and confront local government and police officers. The demonstrators demanded the departure of PT. SJI from Toboali's territorial waters. Chair of Neighborhood 4 (interview A, 7/9/2019) said:

*"When the demonstration took place, we were set up to act anarchist, a number of police were provoking us to carry out a burn-in. The KIP's licence has been revoked by the Regent and we have held the revocation letter but the KIP has insisted on operating. Previously, we had submitted a report to the police but there was no follow up. Even though the license revocation letter was signed before the council, the prosecutor's office and the police "*

The fishermen community claims the mining activities carried out in the territorial waters without prior socialization to the Batu Perahu community who work as fishermen. Community permission is believed to be obtained from groups that do not depend on the economic life of the sea but the farmers and miners. In addition, government representatives who administer licenses are seen as never present during conflicts while mining operation license are granted by the local government. When conflicts arise, fishermen are "forced" to confront the company directly.



**Figure 2:** The Protest Motives of Offshore Tin Mining in Batu Perahu Neighborhood



The rejection drama indeed ended with the revocation of PT. SJI on 2 March 2015 although later, the decision was deemed invalid after PT. SJI filed a lawsuit through the Palembang State High Court of Business. The annulment of the decision at the PTUN level means that the government permits approval of PT. SJI is still valid.

According to the chief of the fishermen group (interview J, 9/7/2019) several factors caused the fishermen's protest: first, the fishing zone is the location that will be mined so that the seabed will be damaged if mined, whereas reclamation of sea is never exist. The form of seabed damage due to KIP is understood as the form of damage caused by mining on mainland, there are pits and mud will affect the marine environment due to the influence of currents. Second, there is no guarantee of security for fishermen's activities, if they are given the opportunity to conduct mining activities even though they are legal. Meanwhile, tin reserves begin from the mainland past the boat mooring location to the fishing zone. The facts have proven that the presence of KIP will bring in illegal unconventional tin mining becoming increasingly out of control. These are two main reasons to rejecting the existence of mining activities in the territorial waters both legal and illegal.

The offer of compensation from IUP holders has been conveyed several times both personally and the group, regarding the needs of the fishermen including the assistance of boat engines and fishing equipment as well as cash compensation every month. Likewise with lobbies against powerful local actors, in order to accept the existence of mining activities at sea which ended with an antipathy attitude to the offshore mining activities. Compensation is believed to have never been proportional to its aftermath. Previously, Damai neighborhood resident who was still in the same village had received cash income from mining for 150 thousand rupiahs per 3 months while by fishing the net income was more than 100 thousand per day.

Based on this fact, it can be concluded that the fishermen reject because their livelihood was violated by the mining activity. The consideration of the previous experience that the compensation was never as worthy as the fishermen income. The machinery and fishing gear assistance would not be useful if the fishing zone was devastated.

### **3.3 The Community is Divided in Rebo Village, Bangka Regency**

Rebo territorial waters is WIUP of PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk. The fishermen rejections had started since 1995, it started when KK entered Rebo waters and operated until 2005. After the dredger operation finished in 2006, the partner's KIP replaces KK, which once amounted to dozens

of units. At the end of 2010, there were demonstrations by fishermen who eventually forced the temporary revocation of IUP-OP in these waters.

In June 2019, PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk re-operating in Rebo waters through partner's KIP which not only cause conflicts between community and companies but worse, able to trigger internal conflicts between communities. In the vicinity of the mining area, there are fishing activities from 4 miles to 6 nautical miles. The operation of KIP in the territorial waters has obtained a work order (SPK) which can be issued if it has obtained permission from the local community. However, the fishermen's strong rejection proves that there are still differences in attitudes among the community which then raises the question of how the SPK can be issued?. Is the attitude of the fishermen as the parties who are also interested in terms of access to marine resources intentionally allowed?. The conflict dynamics that occur due to the presence of the KIP are presented in Figure 3.




Figure 3: The Motives of Offshore Tin Mining Conflict in Rebo Village of West Bangka

### 3.3.1 Anti-Mining and Pro-Mining in the Community

Field data shows that the community's attitude toward KIP is classified into anti-mining, pro-mining community, and small group of fishermen in "the grey" area. It is interesting that the

pro-mining community had the bravery to stand up and collected community's signature to prove that "most of the community accept the presence of KIP". They are aware the environmental damages because of KIP but it is better than unconventional tin mining. Besides, Rebo Village will become Special Economic Zones (KEK) so they think total mining by KIP should be done.

*"Previously, I refused KIP then I was asked to help by the head of the committee of managing tin. With dynamic changes, I chose this village to advance through KEK. IUP owners do not want to give permission because mining rights have not yet been conducted (interview S, 7/7/2019). Indeed, mining activities have an environmental impact. However, IUP owners have the IUP-OP and we emphasize marine reclamation. Most of the locally-generated revenue (PAD) come from tin resources and there will be assistance from corporate social responsibility (CSR) and employment opportunity for the community (interview P, 7/7/2019)".*

Pro-mining groups are people who are members of the committee system that was deliberately built by mining companies. Through influential local leaders who are facilitated, they are able to reduce community rejection, play a role in providing an understanding of the benefits of mining activities, and try to change the attitude of anti-mining group. Profit sharing will be obtained and managed by the committee. The committee system is chaired by an influential figure with several members who capable to influence the community. In addition, those who choose pro-mining's attitude will be involved in the mining mechanism as water supplier in KIP, coolie for loading and unloading tin from vessels to the mainland. Finally, the committee system succeed to trigger social jealousy in the community. In the FGD forum (interview, 5/7/2019), some fishermen stated:

*"Companies form committees, there is profit sharing but the members in committees are not transparent, benefits are only enjoyed by certain individuals, this causes new conflicts in the community. While pro-mining fisherman involved in becoming coolie but they are not member of committee, there will be social punishment for fishermen who are on the committee"*

In the FGD, the village apparatus also stated that the compensation is unclear, the committee come to the people and collected the people's signature without any explanation about the profit sharing contribution to the village, fishermen and others (interview F, 5/7/2019). Although in a separate forum, the committee reasoned that the fishermen group did not give them the opportunity to convey this.

While for anti-mining fishermen (Interviews L, A, T and friends, 5/7/2019), stated that the experience due to the operation of offshore mining for 15 years in the Rebo, have reinforced the rejection by the Jermal fishermen. The reasons are (1) the mud resulting from KIP activities causes sedimentation from the seashore up to 4 nautical miles so the fishermen can not moor their boats

on the shores, (2) the mud covers coral reef located in the around of mining area, (3) because of sedimentation and death of coral reef, the Fisherman build the Jermal (blanket nets) that was originally at a distance of 4-6 nautical miles into tens of nautical miles. The impact of KIP mud approximately 40 meters and will extent because of the influence of sea currents. Therefore, fishermen ensure that the impact of the damage caused by KIP is not due to the activities of fishermen, as their statement follow:

*“Near the ex-mining activities, all of the coral reef died. The coral reef will be damaged by bombings and trawlers but in this area there are no such fishing activities, only KIP. The KIP's tailing are not visible, but their mud and diesel fuel reaches the beach, if the tide recedes for tens of miles. The extraordinary impact is to the Jermal which are at a distance of 6-7 miles, feared that mud will spread tens of miles disturbing the Jermal at a distance of 23 nautical miles. KIP's activities stopped nine years ago, we hope that the dead coral can grow again, but the presence of KIP will cause the damage of coral reef again”*

Not only KIP, according to the fishermen chief (interview informant J, 5/7/2019), the waste from the KK mining activities has formed a sand heap (gusung) felt until today, the gusung spreads to disturb fishing lane to the Jermal, so fishermen have dredged gusung to open the lane by their own expense. While from an economic view, based on the experience that the emergence of KIP for more than 4 years in Rebo waters was not contribute significantly to the economy. At that time, 1 ton of rice aid as compensation and responded by the community by returning the assistance. Compensation in the amount of 300 thousand every 6 months is not proportional to the permanent damage caused. Effort was undergone by the KIP owner to meet the fishermen chief of Jermal to offer some deals.

*"I was promised 250 million if KIP could operate and would get a profit of 300 rupiah/kgSn. However, I refused because my behaviour would be remembered even though I died. In addition, there was socialization but the signature were pro-mining while those who anti-mining refused to sign. I suspect these signatures were used as a reference for community acceptance ”(interview J, 7/7/2019)*

Beside the two groups that are pro-mining and anti-mining, there are group of fishermen who have a "gray" attitude, namely the attitude of fishermen who follow all decisions related to KIP, whether the presence of KIP is acceptable or not. If KIP operates, the group does not oppose it. Therefore, fishermen groups in this category are willing to accept all forms of assistance for compensation that the company wants to provide.

### **3.3.2 Violation of Social Order among the Community**

Differences in people's views in addressing the existence of KIP affect their behavior in social relations. Initially, between neighbors and family members formed a strong kinship but the

difference of their view, caused an act as if they did not know each other, even though it did not lead to clashes (interview, J, 7/7/2019). Another event is the demand of jermal fishermen community to fire the hamlet head and the village consultative council head who accommodated pro-mining community. The fisherman rallied and sealed the village office, forced the Rebo Village head to fulfill the demand, even though the dismissal was not through the right mechanism. The dismissal was unprocedural and should be started by the direct summons from the village head to the hamlet head. Second, written invitation letter if the first summons was not heeded. Third, If the hamlet head found guilty, the village head could send a letter to the sub-district head for replacement and dismissal of the hamlet head.

The reconciliation effort facilitated by the Rebo Village Head by inviting all elements of the community, police officers, KIP and IUP holder resulted in dissolution because the company representatives stated that they could not have authority to fulfill the community demands. However, the pro-mining group believes that there were no fishermen representatives who were able to be consulted. The fishermen will remain in their decision to refuse. In addition, the company's efforts to hold meetings outside the village were responded by the community that the meeting had to be held in Rebo Village.

Field data collection shows that KIP can operate because there were negotiation efforts built by KIP owners itself, contacted certain individuals who were considered pro-mining. But unfortunately, in the early of the negotiations never involved the fishermen. The protest was present when KIP has operated and afterwards socialization efforts were carried out. Negotiation efforts are also carried out with fishermen, but again negotiations are only for certain fishermen who are considered influential. In the end, both KIP and IUP owners are only concerned with their smooth mining operation without thinking the interests of marginalized fishing groups relied on the sea.

### **3.4 Double Attitude of Matras's Community in West Bangka**

Like Rebo Village, most of the Matras's territorial water under 5 nautical miles is held by PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk. The history show that the mining activities using KK had lasted approximately 30 years ended in the early 1990s. During the KK operation, although there were pro and anti-mining community but there had never been any turmoil. At present, besides Rebo Village, the Matras community's' aspiration is very well known, representing the Bangka Belitung people who protest the presence of tin mining at sea.


### 3.4.1 History of Community's Rejection toward KIP

PT. Timah (Persero) Tbk issued SPK of partner's KIP to operate in Matras's territorial waters. KIP has operated for 3 months and stopped for the community's rejection. Organized demonstration was held by fishermen group namely "for nebak" together with The Indonesian Forum for Environment (WALHI) and Indonesian Law Student's Association (PERMAHI) that struggled to against the offshore tin mining activities by KIP.

The former Matras Urban Village Head (interview R, 05/15/2019) stated that basically, the Matras's community were not anti-mining and there were various communities involved in illegal unconventional tin mining. The main motive for rejection is the distrust of fisherman towards their representative in the committee system that have a responsible for managing profit sharing donated by KIP owner. The committee did not has transparency in profit sharing and violate commitment in the implementation process, including activities of loading and unloading of tin carried out at sea rather than the agreed place. These were the initial trigger for conflict in the community. He further said that when KIP was agreed by Matras's community to operate in Matras's territorial waters, there would be a lot of illegal unconventional tin mining in this waters uncontrolled causing the community themselves to marginalized. In addition, some fishermen demanded tin demolition activity in this village without being under the coordination of the main committee in Sungailiat. Because demands were not being met, social ties were starting to loose, uncontrolled unconventional tin mining activities coupled with the damage of coral reef covered by mining mud were reasons for rejection of the existence of offshore mining. As a result, the attitude of the people who originally accepted was divided into those who were pro-mining and anti-mining communities. Disharmonization of Matras's community relation is still happening now.

### 3.4.2 Attitude of the Community toward the Presence of KIP Issue

Since KIP succeeded entering Rebo waters, signs of the operation of KIP in the Matras waters began to appear. These signs can be observed from the tidings of KIP's presence to see the local community responds and identify parties who might pro or anti the operation of KIP. Local powerful actors appear to be in a position to reduce the rejection of fishermen who oppose KIP. There are fishermen who will be directly affected, namely Matras fishermen who tethered boats on the Matras beach and Turun Aban fisherman who tethered boats on Tanjung Pikat. Strong protests against KIP carried out by Turun Aban fishermen who have a fishing zone with a distance of 0-1 nautical miles while Matras Fishermen have a history as a group that can accept the existence of KIP that had operated briefly in 2014, have a fishing area of tens of miles.



**Figure 4:** Conflict of Offshore Tin Mining in the Matras Village

The emergence of strong local actor as the pro-mining side is the person who was in the anti-mining side during the conflict in 2014. The actor is the person who state himself to represent the fishermen aspiration. The decision about the KIP can be accepted or not according to the voice of the fishermen. The total number of local fishermen is only around 30 people. Although few in number, learning from the protest or rejection of offshore mining 5 years ago, the voice of the fisherman is very worth to be listened.

The study shows that Turun Aban fisherman are anti-mining and consistently refuse offshore mining. Since the first appearance of KIP in 2014, strong reluctance have been made by Turun Aban fishermen. However Matras fishermen have opened opportunities for negotiations. Following is the statement of Turun Aban fisherman n responding to the issue of the KIP presence (Interviews K, R and A, 3/7/2019):

*"The tidings of the presence of KIP has been a long time, fishermen divided into two views, we (Turun Aban fishermen) refused while Matras fishermen accepted. We don't want KIP to operate in our waters. Basically the economic factors of fishermen, even now the catch of marine resources has been reduced. In the past when KIP was operating, it was Matras fishermen who accepted it while we refused"*

*"When KIP was operating in 2014, compensation was obtained by the Matras fishermen. They talked that we would get compensation, but in reality we never got it, only certain people got it. If from the beginning we got what was their promised, there would be no conflict. At this time, we will not will to receive any compensation. The term, even though our life is at stake "*

Besides, the mining operation KIP had caused the decreased of fish catching. The statement was obtained through interview of Turun Aban fishermen (interview D, 3/7/2019):

*"We have been fishing for a long time, I have been fisherman for 30 years. In the past, the coral reefs were not disturbed, fishermen deliberately looked under the boat to catch fish, but when there were offshore mining by KIP and unconventional tin mining, the lack of fish catching, muddy water, the destroyed coral reef, our fishhook were all slimy. Before the KIP and unconventional tin mining were wide spread, fishermen did not go far to sea. The way of operating KK is different rom KIP, KIP is like a blender. I have dived. In the era of KK, the seabed was still clean while the KIP era was not visible at all"*

The statement above means that the fishermen of Turun Aban rejected the KIP at first, but then changed gradually to receive KIP since Matras fishermen got assistance. However the distrust of the fishermen toward the promised compensation, which was enjoyed by certain person that put personal interests first. This eventually led to the antipathy of Fishermen Turun Aban towards the offshore mining.

The process of conflict in the Matras Village can be observed in the diagram in Figure 1.4. Conflict broke out when fishermen felt distrust to the committee system which was originally built jointly by mining companies and the community. The destruction of the commitment led to demands from the fishermen group who at that time were on the pro-mining side to manage a separate committee system which then could not be fulfilled by the company. As a result of the contradiction, horizontal conflicts arising among the people are still felt today. In addition, the arrival of unconventional tin mining originating from outside the village caused local communities to feel excluded. The government did not present when a conflict occurs, in the end the local community must deal with companies and their own fellow.



#### 4. Various Interest among the Authority and the Subordinate Holder

There were diverse attitude of fishermen in responding to the presence of KIP, but the choice of pro-mining and anti-mining is their effort to maintain their own main source of income and get the maximum benefit from each decision chosen. The impact of offshore mining activities whether it is done legally or does not prove severe environmental damage that will ultimately affect the economy of fishermen. This then puts a small number of fishermen who have the bargaining power of the decision of the mining activities can be accepted or not.

Whiteman (2009) in the justice distribution theory, it is argued that even though a fair distribution of costs and economic benefits is important to many indigenous people, compensation may not be able to compensate for the emergence of ecological, social, or spiritual costs, which leads to feelings of injustice. A study case in Penganak Hamlet, cash revenue-sharing for fishermen is felt by fishermen but in the end the environmental impact of mining activities has reduced the fish catching, triggering concerns about the sustainability of the fishermen's livelihood. In the case of Batu Perahu Bangka Selatan, although they will obtain fair economic benefits as needed, they choose to position themselves as anti-mine parties because they realize that the costs of the impact will not be commensurate. In different cases in Matras and Rebo Villages, the distribution of economic costs and benefits is ultimately able to divide the community. In the end, the company only made a part of the effort to facilitate dialogue and there were no mining operations that encouraged the collaborative design of mechanisms for the emergence of conflicts over resources (Kemp et al., 2011).

However, behind the pro-mining and anti-mining, there was another element rising in the position to change the direction of the pros or cons. It related with the power, referring to the “power relation” theory by Avelino & Rotmans (2009). The first theory explained that the power may consist of the ability to mobilize people and the second theory stated that the person A has more ability to mobilize the resources than B.

In this case study, local stakeholders namely strong local actors who are in the position of pro-mining will get personal benefits, act as a corporate bridge to secure and operate offshore mining activities. The role of these actors then facilitates negotiation efforts and dampens community rejection through a committee system built with the company, managed by the system itself or under the auspices of the village. On the other hand, strong local actors who choose anti-mining attitude will remain in their position despite efforts by the company to negotiate, but as a

voice representative of contra fishermen group has placed the actor's recognition and status as fishermen's representatives.

Referring to the case in Penganak Hamlet, the committee system was able to put down the people's rebellion if it is transparent under the village authority and has legal aspect. Fishermen as the community got the direct impact, getting economy advantage which is bigger than the others. It is important to realize that the environmental impact of mining activities is starting to be felt by the fishermen but fishermen can not seem to refuse because the economic benefits of the mining activities can be felt by all levels of community.

However, due to the lack of transparency in its management, this system was not successfully applied in Rebo Village and Matras Urban Village. Those who enjoy abundant profits are strong local actors and their personnel who have no interest in marine resources. This has created a new conflict where the conflicting efforts against KIP actually occur because the benefits of the committee itself are not in the interests of the fishermen, but the efforts of KIP owners and concessionaires to secure their mining activities.

While in Batu Perahu, rejection made on the basis of environmental damage caused by offshore mine will not be able to replace the economic potential that might be lost from fishermen groups. This is reasonable given how the other three locations ultimately faced an economic downturn while operating costs increased.

Based on the findings in the field, it can be seen that all the coastal areas which are the objects of this study have almost the same character, which is equally confronting two main interests between fishermen and the owner of a tin mining company. But there is an interesting question, why with the same characteristics, but produces different responses from each other. There are at least 3 main findings of the response of community in the coastal area to the offshore tin mining, namely those who accept, those who refuse, and those who divide the community into two interests.

Looking back to statement of Dahrendorf in Ritzer and Goodman (2008), basically the above conditions can be read from the perspective of conflict which always divides the dichotomy between those who have authority and those who become subordinate. The two then form different relationships, referred to as interests. Data in the field shows that basically those who have authority are tin mining companies which normatively have licence and authority to conduct mining which are also part of their exploration business licence. Then why can't they use their

authority uniformly in the four studied areas? The answer is because of the different patterns of struggle of the subordinates.

In the case of Penganak Hamlet, the subordinates chose not to organize themselves and took different paths to accept the presence of large companies, on the one hand they also became part of the mining process at certain times. At least they and the village officials certainly could not do much when the mining authority had taken place long before learning about confrontation appeared at some point. In a different case, Batu Perahu Bangka Selatan, the subordinates organized themselves to provide resistance and cause mining conflicts not to come to light. Meanwhile, in a different case, in the other two regions, namely Rebo and Matras, the subordinates are divided between the interests of those pro-mining and anti-mining.

Referring to Dahrendrof's view, it appears that the subordinates are basically sub-classes in a community. The idea of resistance and subordinate resistance is basically the idea of class struggle, ie those who feel like fishermen, are disadvantaged by the presence of offshore mine that is certain to damage their fishing zone. Their class is formed because subordinates organize themselves well and then unite their interests to respond to the interests of the authorities.

It is interesting that the case of differences in interests that cannot be overcome as shown in the 3 areas studied, the authorities chose to avoid lengthy confrontations and dialogues by slowly withdrawing into their rational choices. In this case, the authorities actually have the opportunity to use the State to fight for their interests, but the fact that they choose to avoid direct confrontation.

This study shows that the authorities chose to utilize other local elites to approach the subordinates, even though in the Batu Perahu case at least it has not yet run optimally. Conflict seems to be avoided when authority holders use their authority wisely, but of course their interests will not ultimately be maximized. Meanwhile, for the subordinates, there is an important question: how long will they be able to deal with consensus efforts when the authorities also utilize subordinate parts to influence each other's interests?

## **5. Conclusion**

This study at least found a few basic things. First, there are 3 models of community response to offshore tin mining aggression by tin mining companies, namely (1) accommodative attitudes with several consensus modes (2) strongly reject unconditionally (3) dual community attitudes with implications for community divisions. The interests of the fishing community are basically the same, namely having an interest in the need to catch fish for fishermen and the need

to earn additional income through compensation. Corporate adaptation determines how negotiations of interest are built. The formation of 3 community response models shows that the variations in the interests of companies and local actors are very diverse. Each locus has its own dynamics by departing on the expected halves of interest.

Secondly, this study also found that the tin mining conflict eventually faced between the authorities and those who were subordinate. Subordinates have their own ways to achieve their interests, while the authorities choose wisely to resolve differences of interest. In the framework of building consensus, the authorities choose to look for alternatives by using fellow subordinates in negotiating their interests.

This research is indeed limited to problems between coastal communities and business licence holders because in reality, the problems that occur in the field are more complicated. In addition to legal mining, coastal communities must also face illegal mining activities carried out by local residents and migrants. In a number of locations, sea areas were identified as containing fishing activities, legal mining activities, and illegal mining activities. It is interesting to conduct further research on a case-by-case basis among the conflicting parties to find a more comprehensive map of conflicts that occur in the field.

## References

- Adonteng-Kissi, O. (2015). Identifying the sources, causes and costs of conflicts in the Prestea mining community. *International Journal of Community Development*, 3 (2), pp: 64-78. doi: 10.11634/233028791503713.
- Avelino, F. and Rotmans, J. (2009). Power in transition: an Interdisciplinary framework to study power in relation to structural change. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 12 (4), pp: 543–569. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1368431009349830>
- Bidayani, E. (2009). Economic value analysis of illegal mining with fishery capture and tourism in Tanjung Ular coastal area Kabupaten Bangka Barat. *Akuatik*, 3 (1), pp: 10–12.
- Conde, M. (2017). Resistance to mining: A review in ecological economics, 132, pp. 80–90. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2016.08.025>
- Conde, M. and Le Billon, P. (2017). Why do Some Communities resist mining projects while others do not?. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 4 (3), pp: 681–697. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2017.04.009>
- Department of Energy and Mineral Resources. (2017). *The list of companies submitted temporary*

- cessation for mining business licenses*. Bangka Belitung.  
Department of Energy and Mineral Resources. P (2019). *The map of mining business licence*.  
Bangka Belitung.
- Erman, E. (2010). Actor, access and environmental politics in Bangka tin mining. *Journal of Indonesian in Society*, 36 ( 2), pp: 71–101. doi: 10.14203/jmi.v36i2.640.
- Erman, E. (2014). Tin is blessing or resource curse?: woman, community, and protest in Bangka-Belitung Islands. *Journal of Masyarakat dan Budaya*, 16 (3), pp: 457–472.
- Helwege, A. (2015). Challenges with resolving mining conflicts in Latin America. *The Extractive Industries and Society*, 2 (1), pp: 73–84.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.exis.2014.10.003>
- Ibrahim, et.al. (2019). Between fishing, mining, and suction vessel: The compromise of Teluk Limau people, West Bangka, on tin mining aggression. *International Journal of Social Sciences*, 5 (1), pp: 178–185. <https://doi.org/10.20319/pijss.2019.51.178185>
- Ibrahim, et.al. (2018). From charm to sorrow: the dark portrait of tin mining in Bangka Belitung, Indonesia. *International Journal of Social Sciences*, 4 (1), pp: 360–382.  
<https://doi.org/10.20319/pijss.2018.41.360382>
- Kemp, D. et al. (2011). Just relations and company-community conflict in mining. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 101 (1), pp: 93–109. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0711-y>
- Lassila, M. M. (2018). Mapping mineral resources in a living land: Sami mining resistance in Ohcejohka, Northern Finland. *Geoforum*, pp: 1–9.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.07.004>
- Opoku Mensah, S. and Asare Okyere, S. (2014). Mining, environment and community conflicts: a study of company-community conflicts over gold mining in the Obuasi municipality of Ghana. *Journal of Sustainable Development Studies*, 5 (1), pp:64–99.
- Persson, S., et.al. (2017). What local people? examining the Gállok mining conflict and the rights of the Sámi population in terms of justice and power in *Geoforum*, 86, pp: 20–29.  
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2017.08.009>
- Pratama, S. (2018). The political economy dimension in mining governance conflict (case study: Bangka Belitung governor's regulation about the moratorium of PT Timah, Tbk offshore tin mining 2016) in *Wacana Politik*, 3 (1), pp: 40–53.  
<https://doi.org/10.24198/jwp.v3i1.16084>
- Ritzer, G., & Goodman, D.J. (2008). *Teori Sosiologi Modern*. Jakarta: Kencana Prenada Media

Group.

Sujitno, S. (1996). *Tin History in Indonesia*. 1st edn. Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama.

Whiteman, G. (2009). All my relations: understanding perceptions of justice and conflict between companies and indigenous peoples. *Organization Studies*, 30 (1), pp: 101–120.

<https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840608100518>

Zulkarnain, I. *et al.* (2005). *The Conflict in Tin Mining Region of Bangka Belitung: The Issues and Alternative Solution*. Jakarta: LIPI Press.