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THE ROAD TO POWER AND MADNESS (THE IRONIC FATE OF A GLOBALIZED CHINA?)

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Abstract

Globalization has been fueling the peaceful reemergence of China as a great power – but it is also fueling its demise as one. In presenting that thesis, this essay will look on the connection between globalization and the rising Chinese nationalism through the conceptual lens of ontological security and historical analysis of Sinocentrism. This essay aims to understand as to how globalization has become paradoxical and problematic for China’s ambitions, considering the impact and intensity of anti-Japanese nationalist protests in China last 2012. Will its peaceful rise tragically make it a threat?

Keywords

Sinocentrism, Anxiety, Globalization, Nationalism

1. The Dragon Has Awaken

It is no doubt that the sleeping dragon has already risen from its long slumber after decades of conflict and hardship. After opening to the global market in 1978, China has since experienced growth with an average almost 10 percent per annum – a rapid growth the world has never seen before that it was hailed as an “economic miracle” (Frankel, 2016). And by the dawn of the 21st century, it has become apparent so far that China’s newly acquire economic strength will not drive it to be a revisionist power but rather an ardent upholder of the globalized world

order that has fueled its economic growth. Such perception is grounded on the fact that China over the years has been acquiring both the knowledge of financial and legal practices of the West, and the taste for Western consumer products (Overholt, 2005). However, Overholt (2005) pointed out that China has to create some serious adjustments by joining the World Trade Organization in 2001, for instance lesser state support for state-owned enterprises leading to substantial increase in unemployment and increased presence of foreign companies. But he also pointed that despite of those adjustments, China will continue participating in the world economy as it has greatly benefited in doing so and such benefits have been made evident by significant and rapid improvement in living and working standards of its people.

With President Trump withdrawing the United States from the Trans Pacific Partnership, it has become apparent that US leadership is on an economic retreat, and China has become the *de facto* vanguard of the globalization (Rapoza, 2017). And it has also become clear that during the 2017 World Economic Forum in Davos, China under President Xi has been vigorously attempting to project itself as an ardent promoter of free trade and multilateralism (Rapoza, 2017). With little over a decade since its membership in the WTO, China has made significant Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with both developing and developed countries (e.g. Singapore, Australia, South Korea, Chile, Peru, Pakistan, Mexico, Georgia, Switzerland, Iceland, Costa Rica, New Zealand and the ASEAN) (China FTA Network, 2017). Furthermore, it has no qualms in playing the multilateral game as shown by its participation to international organizations such as the G20 and BRICS, and by its plans of facilitating new ones like the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building-Measures in Asia (CICA), and One Belt One Road related forums (Ekman, 2016).

It is no doubt that globalization through free trade and multilateralism have helped China in its rise as the world's economic powerhouse and consequently enabled it to spread its influence and power in the international arena (Prasad, 2017). But in doing so, China has also contributed in strengthening the economies of other countries and of the world at large. For instance, during the 2008 Financial Crisis, the global economy would have face collapse if it were not for China – one of its biggest players – providing a stimulus program worth 586 billion dollars to boost domestic demand, which as a result, provided a substantial boost to the global economy (Jacques, 2015). Jacques (2015) even went on to say that western economies are already on a life support, and that life support being the growth of China. Moreover, China is taking up the role of a financial patron of various international organizations (e.g. United Nations

Systems, World Bank Group, Regional development banks, other multilateral organizations such as the International Red Cross and Global Environment Facility) through providing significant multilateral foreign aid (Xiong, 2017). Cynics can justifiably point out that China's multilateral foreign aid is its way of 'buying' influence in the international community especially among developing countries that would enthusiastically welcome Chinese companies and loans. Yet nonetheless no one can deny that China's self-interests have also opened opportunities for common development, which would be of great help for countries of the global South. One exemplar is Africa, according to Financial Times (2017), China's aid, infrastructure projects and peacekeeping missions in the continent have not only garnered China a positive image among Africans but also have been mutually beneficial for the economies of China and African countries.

China is now the de facto leader of globalization, and judging from its recent enthusiasm for free trade and multilateral diplomacy one can say that it has no intention of stepping down from being so. It is because of the fact that globalization has been the key factor in enabling China in its pursuit to reinstate itself as a great power. And furthermore it has become the core attribute of China's major power status. Hence globalization is China's source of material and ideational power, and that is why it will never and could not turn its back from it anymore. If ever China failed to be the vanguard of globalization then it would not only be crippling for the global economy but also weakens its international power considerably – the “Chinese dream” will be just a dream. Given what is at stake, China has no choice.

However globalization – like mercury – is useful as much as it is dangerous. It is dangerous not because of inevitable economic backlashes per se but because of its existential impact in the society and ultimately in the individual himself – the amplification of social anxiety. If ever that is the case, by making globalization as its primary instrument in its pursuit for power, then China is making itself susceptible to the negative existential impact of globalization. And this essay will argue that by making itself susceptible to the anxiety of a globalized world, China can inadvertently fuel nationalistic sentiments to its extreme that in turn will undermine globalization as its source of material and ideational power. China can cut its own throat in its pursuit of power through globalization. In presenting that argument, this essay shall be divided into two discussions: (1) the connection between globalization and exceptionalist worldviews by looking on the concept of ontological security, and (2) the nature

of Sinocentrism and the rising tide of nationalism in China. This essay ultimately aims to reflect on whether China's peaceful rise will tragically make it a threat to international peace.

2. Modernity and Anxiety

Globalization, in its continuous development of technological communications, marks the latest stage of modernity (Giddens cited in Navari, 2003). And modernity, as generally characterized by Giddens (1991), is the "regularized control of social relations across indefinite time-spaces distances" (pp. 17). This condition of humanity, as Giddens observes, emerges from its effects on human societies and on the individual himself. First it has led to the reorganization of time and space with the interconnection between time and space is being severed due to rise of technological communication – this consequently implies that sense of time, which varies across different cultures, has been uniformed and emptied of any significance. Second it has led to the disembedding of social institutions wherein traditional practices are being replaced by impersonal forces such as the 'expert-system' (knowledge independent of practitioners and clients) and 'symbolic tokens' (developed money economy). Third, as a result of the first two effects, it has led to a world of high reflexivity wherein the dynamism brought by constant breakthroughs and daily stream of new information put the certainty of knowledge and social life into constant scrutiny. These effects have ultimately made the past irrelevant, the present unpredictable, and the future open. And as a consequence, modernity has created a world of risk – it has become problematic because there is no stable guidebook as to how one ought to live thus every action looms different unknown consequences that threatens the overall existence of an individual (Giddens, 1991). With such uncertainty, anxiety plagues both human societies and individuals since no one knows what will and can happen, and most importantly, no one knows what actions people might do. This is why it is up to people themselves to regulate their actions and establish risk-reducing strategies to enable them to at least calculate risk and lessen anxiety (Giddens, 1991).

However, Giddens (1991) pointed out, as globalization goes on, so as the ever-increasing presence of risk and anxiety. Thus people are increasingly concerned not only of their physical safety but also of their own existential security. They are driven more than ever to look for risk-reducing ways in order to create some sense of stability in their lives. This search for existential security in the midst of modernity's uncertainty is from which Giddens develops the concept of 'ontological security'. Such kind of security provides an individual a 'protective cocoon' that

shields him from the chaos or ‘existential anxiety’ that lurks everyday of his life. This protective cocoon however can only be realized through the presence of trust in the individual. It is with the feeling of trust that such existential shield is able to provide him with a sense of existential stability as it enables him to make sense of primary existential questions regarding external reality, mortality, existence of other persons, self-identity (biographical narrative of the self). And as Giddens pointed out, the protective cocoon of ontological security is established and preserved through the routines and ‘regimes’ that are respectively created by individuals and their societies. These routines help individuals to have a sense of continuity and identity in their lives. Yet if individual’s sense of self-identity is becoming increasingly disconnected with his life routines then it leads to ontological insecurity – an experience of existential anxiety – which either manifested through the feeling of shame, or behaviors of narcissism and cynicism. As Giddens notes, feelings of distrust and anxiety breed hostility and aggression.

Although it is not the experience of ontological insecurity per se that drives the predatory inclinations of an individual. It is his intolerance of such experience that drives him towards aggression because the way he deals with anxiety lies on deepening his attachments to his routines in order to reestablish ontological security. As a result he becomes so engross with them that he sees anything that can change these routines as a threat to his self-identity and ultimately to his existence (Wilmott cited in Mitzen, 2006). Anxiety is basically the fear of the unknown – it has no clear specific object or source – but in the case of a hostile individual, anxiety through a perceived or imaginary source has become an existential threat (Giddens, 1991; Mitzen, 2006). It is this existential struggle of an individual in its pursuit of ontological security that inspired the developing scholarship of ontological security in the field of International Relations.

The concept of ontological security is subsequently transplanted in the field of IR under the assumption that states, like people, also experience the feeling of anxiety of a globalized world and thereby also seek ontological security (Kinnvall, 2006; Mitzen, 2006; Steele, 2008). Thus such assumption also implies that states have a sense of identity and consequently predatory inclinations. And as discussed earlier, a strong yet predatory identity – wherein the individual is rigidly attach to his perceived identity – emerges and sustained through the objectification and demonization of anxiety. The State is no different in its pursuit of a strong unifying identity as it also objectifies its feeling of anxiety through “securitization of subjectivity” – by creating a demonized ‘Other’ from within and without (Kinnvall, 2006). Kinnvall (2006) argues that such predatory identity-formation of the State is brought by

globalization's 'cataclysmic' impact because not only it has turned the world highly reflexive but also it has made societies increasingly fluid, pluralistic and fragmented. Hence, globalization exacerbates anxiety through the feeling of homelessness, which consequently fuels the 'refortification' of cultures and the rise of fundamentalism of the dominant group in the society (Kinnvall, 2006). At the center of the rising tide of fundamentalism is the Other, which will enable the State to harness the nationalistic fervor of the dominant group of its society thereby create a strong coherent sense of self-identity and provide itself a 'repository' or scapegoat of its own flaws and inadequacies. And continued demonization of the Other sustains and intensifies nationalistic sentiments as the hatred that it inspires brings out a sense of common history and culture – which, as Kinnvall pointed out, characterized by biasedly chosen traumatic and glorious experiences.

Therefore does this imply that as the world becomes highly globalized, the State is inevitably susceptible in becoming predatory? If it does then does it not run contrary to the supposed rationality of the State? Why become something that can lead to self-harm? The answer is as simple as it is incomprehensible – it gives their existence a sense of meaning (Mitzen, 2006; Kinnvall, 2006; Steele, 2008). And as pointed out by Sullivan, starting from infancy, the individual's need for security from anxiety is more basic than his impulses coming from feelings of hunger and thirst (Sullivan cited in Giddens, 1991). It is from this fact that the very concept of ontological security highlights the impact of emotions in shaping the rationality of the individual and of the State itself – thereby, at the end of the day, their behaviors are ultimately and unpredictably driven by hatred, love and dread. Poetic as it might sound, but those emotions make life more vivid and colorful. Thus the concept of ontological must be taken into account in the analysis of international relations as it enables deeper understanding of today's globalized world. But more importantly, it enables in-depth reflection of China's rising nationalism – will it push China to compromise its own power?

3. The Center of the World

For almost two millennia, China had been a formidable power in its own right. In its long history as an imperial power in Asia, China had been able to demonstrate its military prowess in both land and sea, which enabled it to exercise suzerainty over its neighboring countries. In terms of economic might, it facilitated for centuries the lucrative Silk Road trade in both land and sea, which reached its climax during Zheng He's expeditions (1405-1433) in Asia and

Africa. But beyond its hard power, what really enabled China to be the respected power in the East is its cultural influence to neighboring countries – from technology and science to arts and philosophy. China therefore for centuries had been shaping not only the political and economic landscape of Asia but also the very way of life of nations it has influence upon. Thus it only makes sense that China sees itself as the center of the world – the Middle Kingdom – that is above all nations and cultures (Kissinger, 2014). Kissinger (2014) pointed out that this Sinocentric understanding of the world is different from Western exceptionalism because of the fact that the latter intends to spread its culture while the former demands respect to its culture – affirming the view that China has no equals and does not intend to make others as its equals. But everything started to change with the burning of Zheng He’s fleet.

After the Yongle Emperor of Ming China decided to suspend Zheng He’s expeditions and his son, the Hongxi Emperor, burned the admiral’s treasure fleet ships, China retreated into 200-year isolation while Europe thrived to become the industrial powerhouse of the world (Edwards, 2017). No one exactly knows why the Yongle Emperor put an end to Zheng He’s expeditions. The reason agreed most by historians is that they are just too expensive and the treasures that they brought back are not enough to pay the expenses needed to sustain them. But there is another theory being proposed and it argues that the Yongle Emperor stopped the expeditions because of free trade – he is afraid that it is a sign of weakness since if China is as great and abundant as it is then it has no need to trade with barbarian nations (Deaton cited in Edwards, 2017). One can argue that Deaton’s theory is plausible due to the fact such reasoning is also echoed by the Qianlong Emperor of Qing China in 1792 with his refusal of free trade with the British Empire. In his refusal letter to the Macartney mission he proclaims,

“Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders. There is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce.” (Qianlong Emperor, Second Edict to King George III of England, 1792)

It is with this letter that Imperial China sealed its fate. It is ironic that its Sinocentrism, which greatly contributed to its greatness, is also the reason of its downfall.

Failing to open China through peaceful means, and with its money draining away, British merchants smuggled opium into the country. And they are able to get what they want – they are

able to save up money because instead of silver they bought tea by selling opium, and because of Chinese authorities' blockade of their merchant houses due to illegal opium trade, they are able to convince Parliament to forcibly open China through war. China was easily defeated by the British in the First Opium War (1839-1842) due to the naval and technological superiority of the latter. The war concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Nanking in 1842 that ceded Hong Kong to Great Britain – and thus marking the beginning of China's traumatic "Century of Humiliation". China's weakness quickly encouraged other European powers and the newly modernized Japan to also forcibly pressure the ruling Qing government for exclusive trading rights and concessions. China however tried to resist but ended up being humiliated by a series of defeats (e.g. Second Opium War, First Sino-Japanese War, Boxer Rebellion). The Qing Empire finally collapsed in 1912, but the new Chinese Republic under Sun-Yat Sen was still plagued by internal fragmentation from factional warlords and external threat from Japan. China's humiliation reached its tragic climax during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) when Japan conquered large swaths of Chinese territory, and massacred hundred thousands of civilians (notably the 1937 Nanking Massacre). And even after Japan was defeated in 1945, China suffered another civil war between Chiang's Koumintang and Mao's Communists. Only by 1949, when Mao proclaimed the establishment of People's Republic of China that China's "Century of Humiliation" ended but nonetheless it continues to be the core narrative of Chinese nationalism (Kaufman, 2011).

Chinese nationalism began to emerge after the defeat in the 1839 Opium War but nonetheless it has taken different forms over the decades as enumerated by Zhao (2005). First, an ethnic centered nationalism took shape from the increasing resentment of ethnic Han majority towards the ruling Manchu elite over China's defeats from foreign powers. Second, Western educated Chinese gave rise to liberal nationalism, which promotes democracy and individual rights at home but more aggressive foreign policies. Traces of liberal nationalism vanished during Mao's Communist China, however it reemerged during Deng Xiaoping's Reform Era and has since motivated political movements within the Chinese society such as the 1989 Tiananmen Square Protests, 1999 protests against NATO bombing of Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and 2005 Shanghai Anti-Japanese Protests (Zhao, 2005). Together with the reemergence of Chinese liberal nationalism, is the conception of a third form of nationalism – state-led nationalism driven by Deng's adherence to pragmatism. Such pragmatic form of nationalism promoted by the Communist Party of China (CPC). Unlike the confrontational character of liberal nationalism,

this puts value more on sustaining economic benefits for the country rather than compromising them for the sake of national pride. As pointed out by Hughes (2006) by seeing its ties with the global economy as means of improving domestic and international conditions for China, the CPC's version of state-led nationalism is in practice a globalistic form of nationalism.

The main difference between CPC's state-led nationalism and the two earlier forms of Chinese nationalism is that the former is less ideological than the latter two (Zhao, 2005). Thus while they all intend to make China great again, they all can be characterized based on their different views as to how to achieve that goal. Ethnic centered nationalism is nativist in nature thereby emanating a strong Sinocentric view. And according to Forsby (2011) Sinocentrism has four identity-markers: (1) Sino-civilization – an exceptionalist worldview different with the current liberal international order as such worldview is based on a hierarchical structure that placed China at the center of the world, (2) Confucian philosophy – emphasis on collectivism and authority rather than on individual rights as a foundation of social order, (3) dynastic authoritarianism – disregard of the institution of sovereignty in favor of foreign policies based on reestablishing suzerainty, and (4) Han ethnocentrism – calls for a homogenous Han China driven by racist sentiments and the narrative of “Century of Humiliation”. Liberal nationalism shares the confrontational attitude of this traditionalist worldview but only in the sphere of foreign policy, it still considers Chinese traditions as the reason of China's backwardness while progressive Western culture as the only way forward (Zhao, 2005). On the other hand, the Party maintains a pragmatic sense of nationalism – it neither fully adheres to traditionalists nor to anti-traditionalists. Instead it maintains a delicate balance between economic growth and nationalism, and by doing so it is able to maintain its legitimacy (Blackwill & Campbell, 2016).

However, as Blackwill and Campbell (2016) observes, the Party's legitimacy under Xi Jinping's leadership is increasingly strained by the slowing economic growth of China and the growing frustration and anxiety that come with it. Such slowing economic growth puts the average citizen at risk as it worsens unemployment – with 8 million college graduates struggling to get a job in China's shrinking labor market – and widens the already wide inequality gap between rich and poor (Blackwill & Campbell, 2016). Along with the slowing economy are the growing cases of corruption in the country, which according to Carneige Endowment costs China 200 billion dollars or 3 percent of its GDP every year, that consequently creates anxiety as it highlights a significant moral decline in the society (Huang, 2013). What adds more fuel to the fire is that the slowing economy growth demonstrates the apparent weakness of China in

controlling impersonal forces of globalization such as the global money economy. The collapse of Chinese stock market in 2016 and the government's hasty attempts to stabilize it further caused anxiety to both consumers and business investors. Blackwill and Campbell (2016) pointed out that this anxiety can potentially compromise China's economic transition from a investment-manufacturing based economy to a consumer-services oriented one.

Ironically it is this economic rebalancing to have a more market-oriented economy, which contributes to its slowing economic growth (Frankel, 2016). China's rapid growth has been fueled by its strong yet cheap manufacturing industries but that economic model is increasingly unsustainable because (1) shrinking population size due to one-child policy, (2) increasing demand for blue-collar jobs, and (3) China's export markets can no longer absorb the surpluses of its manufacturing industries (World Finance, 2016; Blackwill & Campbell, 2016). Thus the government shifted away from such economic model resulting to an output decline of industrial products such as coal, steel and cement (Frankel, 2016). In turn, China shifted into seeking more domestic consumer markets and creating more domestic consumer products and services (Lomas, 2017). A sustainable market-oriented economy is crucial for China as its promise of continues growth will enable it to also promote global economic growth (China Daily, 2015). This bluntly implies that with such economic model – as it enables deeper integration with the globalized world – China is poised to cement its role as the undisputed leader of globalization. However in realizing this vision, Xi is unleashing nationalistic sentiments as a distraction from the anxiety coming from realizing such vision in the first place (Blackwill & Campbell, 2016). Thus it can be said that the resurgence of Chinese nationalism comes from the fact that it provides China a sense of ontological security as it struggles with anxiety created by its deepening ties with globalization.

But the kind of Chinese nationalism that Xi fuels through his "Chinese Dream" is strikingly different to the pragmatic form espoused by Deng's concept of "Tao Guang Yang Hui" (韬光养晦, "hide capabilities, keep a low profile") (Sørensen, 2015). Xi's "Chinese Dream" is based on the idea of "Fen Fa You Wei" (分发有为, "striving for achievement"), it is therefore radically forward-looking form of nationalism. But what does it strive for? In essence, it strives to *actively* demonstrate China's restoration as a great power (Sørensen, 2015). However in practice, questions are being raised as to how China will demonstrate such nationalistic ambitions and as to how will it affect international relations. As shown by Sørensen (2015), the way in which the "Chinese Dream" is to be realized depends on the narratives that constitute it.

The West perceives that the Sinocentric character of Xi's "Chinese Dream" creates a vengeful national identity strongly motivated by the "Century of Humiliation" narrative (Sørensen, 2015) – it thus expresses nothing less of China's ambition to be the great power it was by blood and will. However Sørensen (2015) argues that Xi through his "Chinese Dream" actually intends to create a new nationalist narrative, which emphasizes the positive achievements of the past Imperial China rather than on the negative narrative of "Century of Humiliation" – it reemphasizes the need for China as a great power to be an active constructive force for the world. Considering that understanding, it thus highlights Sinocentrism as a positive worldview – in which reverence instead of domination that forms the core of China's power. Nonetheless, using nationalism as a means is a double-edge sword.

As Xi's nationalism is created to ease people's anxiety, then therefore one can say that it will ultimately depend on the people themselves to decide if Xi's positive nationalism is enough or if it requires a more extreme interpretation. And with China relentlessly pursuing to become one with the globalized world, it seems that the anxiety that comes with it is driving Chinese nationalism to what the West perceives it to be.

The 2012-13 anti-Japanese protests concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute demonstrate this increasing populist and aggressive character of the supposed Xi's state-led nationalism (Sørensen, 2015). This all started when Chinese netizens were infuriated by the statement made by Tokyo Governor Ishihara, which insinuates that China should have no problem with Tokyo buying some of the disputed islands from their Japanese owners because of the fact that the islands does not belong to China in the first place (Gries, Steiger & Wang, 2015). And another thing that angered them is the weak response of their government that had only limited itself to mere statements of territorial sovereignty (Gries, Steiger & Wang, 2015). The increasing public anger in the Internet had triggered a vengeful nationalism driven by the humiliating memory from the Treaty of Shimonoseki – when China was forced to cede to Japan the island of Taiwan. This later escalated to a popular boycott of Japanese products, damaging of Japanese properties in Qingdao, Shenzhen, Beijing and other major cities, and massive protests directed to both Japan and the Communist Party (Gries, Steiger & Wang, 2015). The situation had become so dire that for a time Japanese manufacturing companies in China stopped operation (e.g. Toyota Motor Corp., Honda Motor Co., Nissan Motor Corp., Panasonic, and Canon Inc.) (Clement, 2012). Increasingly worried, the government first tries to urge restraint by pointing out that it is through a 'rational' nationalism that China was able and will continue to be

able to establish itself as a respectable power (Gries, Steiger & Wang, 2015). But in the end, to increase its weakening public support, the government was pressured into sending the PLA Navy in the disputed islands leading to a tense standoff with the Japanese Coast Guard (Gries, Steiger & Wang, 2015).

The anti-Japanese protests of 2012-13 showed the growing predatory character of Chinese nationalism under Xi, which is far from his intended nationalism if his positive Sinocentric view is to be believed. In its essence, this predatory nationalism is anti-foreign – hinged on the demonization of the ‘Other’ – as shown by its zealous protests against “Japanese dogs” and “Han traitors” that consequently disrupted economic relations between China and Japan for several months (Gries, Steiger & Wang, 2015). It has also made it more difficult for China to strengthen its economic ties with Japan through a free trade agreement, which is a major obstacle in its bid for economic integration for East Asia (Li, 2014; Xue, 2017) – and arguably a major blow to China’s image as the poster child of globalization. But the 2012-13 anti-Japanese protests have also shown the Party’s willingness to go along with such dangerous kind of nationalism as long as it lessens social anxiety and bolsters their legitimacy, which they need if China’s economic balancing is to be successful. Thereby cementing China’s great power status and legitimacy of the Communist Party requires a stronger sense of ontological security that an intensifying Chinese nationalism provides. But can a rabid dog be a faithful guard? Maybe, for a time – but sooner or later it will rip its owner apart.

4. Conclusion

Napoleon Bonaparte once said, “China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep for when she wakes she will shake the world”. China has indeed awakened but it has not yet shaken the world. Instead, it has adapted well with the world. And it is well aware that in by doing so it is able to reawaken itself, and in only by continuing to do so that it will be able to reestablish itself as a respectable great power. Globalization has been the potent fuel of China’s reemergence thus it is no surprise that China is doing everything it can to make it the cornerstone of its global power. But in its bid to make globalization an enduring source of its power, China is dangerously exposing itself to the anxiety of a globalized world. Anxiety emerging from globalization is driving the pursuit for a stronger sense of ontological security, which is apparent in the rising ‘toxic’ form of Chinese nationalism. Thus as China continues to demonstrate its power by becoming the foundation of globalization, it is also stoking the fire of nationalism that will burn

such aspirations to the ground. And if China gives in to the predatory cries of nationalism, it would just be a matter of time before Napoleon's prophecy comes true.

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