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ISLAM AND COLONIALISM: THE RESPONSE OF THE MUSLIMS IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES TO WESTERN COLONIALISM AND LEGACIES

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Abstract

Since the onset of Western colonialism in the Philippines, the Muslims in the South indefatigably resisted Western colonialism to preserve their cherished values, identity, culture, and freedom. Using various social change theories, writers and researchers tried but failed, to explain the motivation of Muslims behind this phenomenon. Although Islam played a vital role in shaping the attitude of the Muslims, none of the concerned scholars yet attempted to understand the issue from the Islamic perspective. Thus, the present study aims to investigate the relation between Islam and the responses of Muslims in the Southern Philippines to the challenges which the western colonialism posed upon them. The researcher used historical analysis of data gathered through library research. The paper showed that Islam played a paramount role in shaping the Muslims' attitudes and responses to the challenge of Western colonialism. Islamic principle served as the pillar of their struggle for decolonization. Hence, without Islam, the western colonial powers would have successfully colonized the Muslims in the Southern Philippines similar to what they did to the people of Luzon and Visayas Islands.

Keywords

Armed Jihad, Islamic Perspective, Muslims' Response, Southern Philippines, Western Colonialism

1. Introduction

In the 1960s, the Muslims in the Southern Philippines, under the leadership of Shaykh Salamat Hashim and other Moro Ulama (Muslim scholars), laid down the foundation of the movement to counter the challenges posed by Western colonialism and legacies in the Southern Philippines. They aimed for the decolonization of the Bangsamoro society through comprehensive Islamic reformation. However, the wave of political crisis sweeping across the Bangsamoro society in the 1970s radicalized them and turned the peaceful and non-violent reform movement into an active armed *jihad* and resistance movement against the Philippine Government.

Due to the gravity of destruction, it caused, the Bangsamoro armed resistance gained the attention of many social science scholars and researchers. With their diverse backgrounds and perspectives, they offered a variety of explanations and prescriptions. George (1985) claims that the Muslim's armed struggle is the Bangsamoro attempt to secede from the Philippine government. He identified some triggering factors like economic exploitation of Mindanao, the establishment of government-sponsored agricultural settlements or colonies in Mindanao, and the competition between Muslim and Christian leaders in some areas of Mindanao during the 1971 local elections the majority of which the latter had won. He further claims that Moro fronts use Islam, not only to co-opt the Muslim masses to the revolution but also to attract the support of Muslim countries.

Following suit, Majul (1985, pp. 29-30) claims that this kind of Muslim response was triggered by several interrelated reasons such as (a) Muslims found it difficult to appreciate the national laws, especially those pertaining to personal or family relations, for they were clearly derived from Western or Catholic moral values; (b) the public school system under the Republic did not differ much from that which the Americans had introduced, and commonwealth had developed, and (c) Muslims had deep resentment of-and later, violent reaction to-the steady influx of settlers to parts of Mindanao (pp. 29-30).

On the other hand, Gowing (1987, p. 57-59) asserts that the contemporary Moro struggle is the continuation of the centuries-old Moro resistance against colonialism and the influence of the global Islamic resurgence. According to him, the Moro armed resistance in the 1960s contributed to the evolution of the Bangsamoro struggle to secede from the Philippine government. Che Man (1990, pp. 57-59) identifies two major factors that contributed to the rise

of what he believes as Moro separatist movement. These are the deepening sense of Islamic consciousness and the deepening sense of deprivation.

Finally, Chalk (2002) argues that this phenomenon is a manifestation of Islamic militancy which was sustained by four factors, namely: "resentment of Catholic transmigration from the North, unwillingness to subscribe to Manila's secular civil, political, judicial, and penal constitutional system, frustration borne out of Mindanao's lack of economic and infrastructural development, and fear of having religious, cultural and political traditions weakened (or possibly destroyed) by forced assimilation into the Catholic-dominated Philippine Republic" (pp. 189-90).

The recurrence of armed jihad movements as seems to be the favorite response of Muslims in the Southern Philippines to Western colonialism and its legacies was essentially rooted in the Islamic-inspired attitude towards foreign aggression. Although Islam played a paramount role in shaping the Muslims' attitude and behavior, researchers and scholars mostly ignored it. Hence, this paper investigates the Islamic basis and roots of the responses of Muslims in the Southern Philippines to Western colonialism: the Spanish crusade, the American imperialism, and the Philippine neo-colonialism. Based on the Islamic perspective, the Muslims wage armed jihad against their perceived enemies, like the Western colonialists and their agents, because they want to defend their cherished values, identity, culture, and homeland.

2. Background: Islamization of Sulu and Mindanao

After the demise of the prophet in 632 CE, the Dar al Islam (as so called by the classical jurist for the abode of Islam) gained much wider territories as "most of the Arabian Peninsula had come under his control, and Islam was already knocking at the gates of the two superpowers at the time: Byzantium to the north and the Sasanian empire to the east. A decade later the hitherto Byzantium territories of Palestine, Syria, and Egypt, as well as the former Sasanian Iraq and Persia, had been conquered. By 732 CE (hundred years after the prophet's death), Dar al Islam...extended from Spain and southern France across North Africa, Syria, Iraq, and Iran to India and Central Asia as far as China" (Abd Al-Rahim, 1988, p. xv).

Certainly, the Islamization of the southern Philippines was part of the then rapid expansion and diffusion of Islamic culture across the globe. At around the last quarter of the 13th century, religious men like Tuan Mashaika and Tuan Maqbalu introduced Islam in the present Island provinces of Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. Of Arab origin, they came all the way to the Islands from Yemen through Johore, Malaysia for a trading purpose; they married local ruling family

members and raised up their families. They introduced the essential elements of Islam (Majul, 1973, pp. 56-60).

Approximately around the second half of the 14th century, missionaries probably of Sufi inclination like the Makhdumin arrived in Jolo. Through their missionary works, they augmented the Islamization process as they made more natives get attracted to and embraced Islam. The introduction of the Muslim political institution of the sultanate accredited to Rajah Baginda who arrived in Sulu at the beginning of the 15th century from Sumatra and established the first sultanate therein further reinforced the Islamization process. When Sharif Abubakar, a Muslim jurist of Arab descent, who married the daughter of Rajah Baginda, came in the middle of the 15th century, the deep penetration of Islam to the Suluanos was almost completed (Majul, 1973, p. 63).

In mainland Mindanao Sharif Awliya who came all the way from Johore to the present Magindanaw approximately around 1460 brought Islam. As other Muslim missionaries did, he married a local lady in the area, begot a daughter, and then left. A few years later, Sharif Maraja, also from Johore, came in and married the daughter of Sharif Awliya (Majul, 1973, p.65). Through them, Islam was made known to the local inhabitants. But what made Islam a more dominant religion in mainland Mindanao as claimed by another account was through "a certain Sharif Kabungsuwan, who settled with some followers on the island and married there. It was said that when he arrived on the shore of Illana Bay, he refused to land until the men who came to meet him on his arrival promised to embrace Islam..." (Arnold, 1913, p. 399). Through his da'wah works, Islam spread from Cotabato and Malabang to the interior part of Maguindanao, to the Iranun and Maranao world. Present ruling families of Maguindanao, Maranao, and Iranun trace their so-called royal ancestry to Shariff Kabungsuwan.

The Islamization of Sulu and mainland Mindanao made a tremendous impact on the Muslims in the southern Philippines that the Islamized tribes, now known as Moros, "gained from Islam a high sense of religious community, new laws, a more developed political organization, a new system of writing, and above all, a new ethical outlook on life" (Majul, 1973, p. 78). For this reason, a renowned Filipino historian claims that "if history had taken its course undisturbed, the Muslims might have Islamized the whole archipelago. They could have seized the leadership in nation-building...but the development of the Philippines took a reverse course. Instead of the more developed society expanding its influence over the others and diffusing its culture and social organization throughout the less developed ones, the Spanish conquest aborted this historical trend..." (Constantino, 1975, pp. 27-28).

3. Western Colonial regimes

3.1 The Spanish Crusade

The Spanish crusade in the Philippines started when the Spanish navigator, Ferdinand E. Magellan accidentally landed in Limasawa Island, Cebu in 1521. Bringing with him the Catholic fanaticism, he tried to plant the seed of Catholicism in Cebu, the Philippines by forcing the natives to convert to his religion (Hurly, 1936 and 2009, pp. 46-48). While most of the Cebuanos succumbed to the forced conversion, Lapu-Lapu, a Muslim chief, stepped up the first Muslim resistance against the foreign colonial attempt. In the first battle between Muslims and Christians that took place in Mactan, Rajah Lapu-Lapu killed Magellan. Magellan's surviving crews fled back to Spain. Thus, ended the first Spanish crusade.

However, a few decades later, Miguel Lopez de Legaspi, led the Spanish expedition and anchored directly to the shores of Cebu in 1565. He made a blood compact with the animist natives to symbolize their fraternity. Following the footsteps of Magellan, he gave the natives only two choices: either embrace Christianity or face death (Hurly, 1936 and 2009). Because the Visayans were poorly organized, least cultured, and civilized, many of them, who were at the time mostly animists, embraced Christianity out of fear for their lives. Consequently, like other vanquished people, the native Visayans imitated the Spanish way of life, embraced their religion, and finally become their loyal subjects (Hurly, 1936 and 2009). For several years, the Spaniards made Cebu the Center of their colonial activity in the Archipelago. From there, they staged constant attacks on Muslim-owned vessels that carry goods. In 1567, they stepped up an unprovoked attack on the Bruneian ships transporting products in the Visayan Sea (Majul, 1997, p. 1081) which led to the final defeat of the Bruneians in the Visayan Sea; thus, the Spaniards were left unchallenged. Having realized the strategic importance of the Northern Philippines, Legaspi sent in 1570 an expedition headed by his lieutenant Martin de Goiti to attack the thriving Muslim principalities in Manila and Tondo under the Muslim rulers Rajah Sulayman and Lakandula. In a fierce battle that ensued, the Spaniards killed Rajah Sulayman. With his death, the Muslim resistance in Luzon waned down, and the Spaniards made Manila the capital of the Philippines (Hurley, 1936 and 2009, p. 51).

As soon as they have established their full control of Manila, the Spaniards turned their attention to the Southern Philippines especially the sultanates of Sulu and Mindanao (Majul, 1997). The colonial policy of the Spaniards in Mindanao was enshrined in Governor-General Francisco De Sande's instruction to Captain Esteban Rodriguez Figueroa, the Governor of

Mindanao in 1578. The former instructed the latter: 1) get them to acknowledge Spanish sovereignty over their territory; 2) promote trade with them while obliging them to limit their trade to the Philippine Islands and discover the natural resources of Moroland with a view to their commercial exploitation; 3) bring an end to Moro "piracy" against Spanish shipping and an end to Moro raids on the Christianized settlements of the Visayas and Luzon, and 4) begin the Hispanization and Christianization of the Moros in line with the pattern followed with respect to other Filipino groups, to order the Moro chiefs not to admit anymore "preachers of the doctrine of Mahoma since it is evil and false, and that of the Christians alone is good." Another order was to inform the chief about his conversion to Christianity and the Spaniards' free preaching of the law of the Christians as well as about the natives to be permitted to attend and hear the preaching and to be converted, without receiving any harm from the chiefs" (Quoted in Gowing, 1987, pp. 29-30). Furthermore, the Governor-General instructed Figueroa to identify the preachers of Islam, arrest them and bring them before him and to destroy any mosque where that accursed doctrine has been preached, and not to rebuild it (Gowing, 1987, p. 30).

Guided by this crusade policy, the Spaniards launched the all-out war of conquest against the sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao. This campaign had virtually lasted for more than three centuries until it ended in 1898 when the Americans succeeded as colonizers of the Philippines. Although the attempt was a failed project, it had left lasting impacts on the Moros. Among others, it stopped the slow but continuous spread of Islam in the whole archipelago; it wrought economic havoc upon the Moros as it disrupted the 'time-honored commercial activities of the seafaring Muslims such as Tausugs, the Samals, and the Iranuns. Agricultural tribes such as Maguindanaos suffered a similar setback because of the systematic depopulation of Muslim settlements accompanied by the destruction of farms and plantation' (George, 1985, p. 43). The cultural, intellectual, and technological development of the Moros was arrested as the Muslims had neglected to develop their institutions of learning. With this situation, the Moros had to face another colonial power, the United States of America.

3.2 American Colonialism

The Spanish-American war ended with the defeat of the Spaniards and the subsequent signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1898. Under the Treaty, the Spaniards as vanquished had to cede their claim of sovereignty over the Philippines, including Moro territories, to the American victors. While the Spaniards had the right to do it for the case of Luzon and Visayas, they did not have that right for the case of Mindanao as they never had an opportunity to exercise sovereignty

over the Moroland. Nevertheless, the United States of America accepted the idea. It was through this arrangement that the Moroland became the object of American colonial occupation.

In 1899, the Americans came to the Philippines to assert their sovereignty over the entire archipelago. As a matter of strategy, while they were fighting the Filipino rebels in the North, the Americans avoided Moros to be involved in the fighting. They convinced the Moro leaders of their policy of non-interference to their religion and internal affairs. At the same time, they sought a treaty of peace, known as Kiram-Bates Treaty, with the Sultanate of Sulu. To the naivety of the Sulu sultan, he was convinced of the good motive of the Americans. The core of the treaty includes the Sultan's acknowledgment of the American sovereignty, pledging to help suppress piracy and arrest individuals charged with crimes against non-Moros. In return, the United States agreed to respect the authority of the Sultan and other chiefs" (Che Man, 1990, pp. 46-47).

After the successful subjugation of the Filipino rebellion in the North, the Americans unilaterally abandoned their agreement of peace with Sulu sultan in 1903. The Americans adopted the policy of direct rule and interference to the Moro internal affairs. This policy lasted from 1903 to 1913 whereby the Americans placed Moro sultanates under the charge of military rulers through the special administrative arrangement called Moro Province. After abolishing the authority of the sultanate, the Americans put the Moro sultanates under direct colonial administration. They divided the Moroland into five districts- Zamboanga, Lanao, Cotabato, Davao, and Sulu (Che Man, 1990, p. 48).

To propagate western culture, the Americans abolished the traditional Islamic education or madrasah system of education and replaced it with western secular one. They offered a curriculum that aimed to colonize, westernize and secularize the Muslims. It included the teaching of western values of democracy, the formation of functional citizens and the rights and responsibilities of the people. It used English as a medium of instruction. There were three levels of education- elementary, high school, and college. The public school system was free. The Americans required every child from age seven to register in classes and gave them school materials freely. They even sent some students, especially children of the ruling families, to the US as scholars to continue their studies and become experts in their profession. Upon their return, the government gave them essential positions in the state. Like in other western colonized countries, these young Moros became loyal agents of American colonialists (Lantong, 2018).

The Moros were unhappy with this new development, but the sultans did not take serious attempts to resist the American forces. Hence, some of the "lesser" datus took the initiative to fight the Americans which often resulted in the bloody incidence of Moro massacres. When the

Americans pacified the resisting Moros, they placed from 1913 to 1920 the Moroland under a civilian administration called the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, headed by a civilian administrator, Frank W. Carpenter (Gowing, 1987, p. 35).

Using the policy of attraction, Carpenter worked for establishing Filipino Christian hegemony over the Moros by incorporating Mindanao and Sulu with Luzon and the Visayas, transfer of the control of Moro affairs from Americans to Filipinos, and to continue the socio-political development of the Moro people with the aim of accelerating the course of their integration (Che Man, 1990, p. 51). Carpenter intensified the modernization of health, educational and public works programs in Moroland. Carpenter accelerated the "Filipinization of the administration- that is to say, the number of Christian Filipinos assigned to positions of governmental authority in the region was increased intending to the complete transfer of Moro affairs from American to Filipino control" (Gowing, 1987, p. 37). The Department also fostered a systematic "minoritization" of the Moros in their own homeland by facilitating the "immigration into Moroland of many Christian Filipino settlers from what the colonialists claimed as crowded northern and central provinces of the Philippine archipelago.

In 1920, the Americans abolished the Department of Mindanao and Sulu and replaced it with The Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes which lasted until 1937. Throughout this period, the Department of the Interior, which was mainly under the hands of the Christian Filipinos to whom the US would bequeath the task of colonizing the Moros, administered the Moroland. To prove they are worth with the trust, the Filipinos pursued the policy of their colonial masters earnestly, that is, to integrate the Moros into Philippine mainstream life known as the "Filipinization."

In preparation for Filipino takeover of the Philippine governance, the United States Congress passed the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act in May 1934. This Act called for a constitutional convention (made up of popularly elected delegates) and the establishment of a Commonwealth in which Filipino officials would function with virtually full powers over internal affairs until July 4, 1946, when the nation would become completely independent" (Gowing, 1987, p. 171). But before the transition government could have been implemented, most of the Moros, except some opportunists, expressed their strong opposition to the arrangement. Some expressed it in violent means, while others in the peaceful petition. Those who still trusted the US conscience sent petition letters. For instance, 200 Moro leaders signed a letter drafted by a religious leader, Hajji Abdul Kamid Bongabong, to be sent to the Governor General. They petitioned that "a law be passed that our religion, Islam, taught by Prophet Mohammad be not changed, or curtailed in any way and that we must not be forbidden to

observe our religion" (Quoted in Thomas, 1971, p. 253). To follow it up, another letter signed by Hajji Bongabong and 119 Maranao leaders was given to President Franklin Roosevelt, expressing their concern about the future of the Muslim community under the government of Christian Filipinos, mainly the maintenance of their religion and customs. However, both petitions did not get any response from the US government.

3.3 Philippines Neo-colonialism

In November 1935, the Americans and Filipinos inaugurated the Philippines Commonwealth government with Manuel L. Quezon as President and Sergio Osmena as Vice President (Gowing, 1987, p. 171). Under this government, the Filipino colonial government prioritized the integration of the Muslims into Filipino way of life mostly through education. They believed that "with better education and a large dose of cultural indoctrination, the Muslims would eventually conform to the westernized ways of the new government and the Christian majority" (Majul, 1985, pp. 24-25).

The Filipino government sought the integration of Muslims into the Filipino society. It abolished the little remnants of the traditional social and legal system of the Muslims. It sought to create a colonized Moro citizen through the implementation of a new educational system which emphasized western "progressive" ideas that served to create a conformed new national citizenry. For instance, it introduced rules of conduct that are entirely based on western values; it used in the school's history books teach that the Muslims in the South, who had fought the Spaniards, were pirates and slave traders (Majul, 1985, p., 25).

To make Moro population a minority group in their own homeland, the government pursued a systematic process of encouraging Christian Filipinos of Luzon and Visayas to migrate to mainland Mindanao, the "land of promise." The given justification was "to decrease land disputes in the central provinces of Luzon, to reduce the population in the congested areas of some provinces, to increase agricultural productivity, and to discourage Japanese colonial ambitions in the South" (Majul, 1985, p. 25). This program was so compelling that after few a year have passed, the Muslims have found themselves a minority in their homeland (Majul, 1985, p. 25).

When the World War II broke out in 1941, the Commonwealth government fell upon the hands of the Japanese as its forces occupied the Philippines, including Cotabato, Lanao, and Sulu in the Moroland. Against the Japanese, the Moros were divided; some sided with the Filipinos under the US, while others sided with the Japanese occupation forces. When the war ended with US victory, the Moro leaders who sided with the Filipino government became prominent

politicians. Some of them even became national figures like Gen. Salipada K. Pendatun of Maguindanao, Sen. Domogcao Alonto, and others. Nevertheless, during the commonwealth government, there was no occurrence of Moro-Filipino fighting because both parties, as a result of the World War II, were weak enough to fight each other.

The United States granted independence to the Philippine Republic on July 4, 1946. Without plebiscitary consent, the Americans structurally integrated Moroland into the Philippines territorial domain. The Philippine Republic, as a new colonial entity, continued the old colonial policies of America, namely: maintaining peace and order; promoting Moro integration into mainstream of Philippine life primarily through education, and appropriating modicum amounts of funds for improved communication, health facilities, and other public services, and economic development in Moroland. According to Gowing, "only the first-maintaining peace and order- was pursued with real energy" (Gowing, 1987, p.184).

The government's desire to assimilate the Moro people into the dominant Filipino society ushered in the revival and intensification of the previous strategy of the USA, i.e., "systematic minoritization" of the Moro people in their homeland through the settlement of Filipino settlers from Luzon and Visayas to the hearts of the Moro areas. To this end, the government persuaded the Filipinos to settle to Mindanao with all the promises of good and prosperous life awaiting them therein. Racing for the promised lands, thousands and thousands of the Christians, who received government's all-out support, settled in the Moro traditionally owned lands. This influx paved the way for the opening of Mindanao's wealth and vast lands to the hands of both plain and simple Filipino settlers and capitalists (Majul, 1985, p. 31). The policy was so successful that according to Majul, "By the 1950s, there were so many Christian settlers; they controlled entire towns and were equipped to protect them" (Majul, 1985, p. 31, p. 32).

4. The Responses of Muslims to the Western Colonization in the Southern Philippines

4.1 The Spanish Crusade

The response of the Muslim sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao to the Spanish crusade and colonization was purely armed jihad (struggle). Since the arrival of the Spaniards in 1521, until they left in 1898, the Muslims had been waging armed jihad to defend themselves, their Islamic way of life, culture, civilization and territory. One of the prominent Moro leaders who devoted most of his time to wage armed jihad against the Spaniards was Sultan Qudarat of Maguindanao (Majul, 1997, p. 1085). Under the banner of Islam, he united the Sultanates of

Maguindanao, Buayan, and established an alliance with Sulu Sultanate and Ternate, now part of Indonesia, in waging jihad against the Spaniards. His primary objective was nothing but to repel Spanish attacks and aggression (Majul, 1997, p. 1084).

With unity, solidarity, and cooperation, Sultan Qudarat made successful jihad against the Spanish crusaders. It paved the way for its ally, Sulu sultanate, to possess part North Borneo territory, Spain's recognition of Maguindanao Sultanate under Sultan Qudarat as the sovereign over the large part of the mainland Mindanao, from Sarangani in the South to Ozamis in the North, and from Zamboanga in the West to Davao Oriental in the East (Majul, 1997, p. 1084). Throughout the fifty years of Qudarat's reign, the Muslims had experienced peace in their homeland as the Spaniards did not dare to provoke the Sultan. But the glory of Maguindanaons that Sultan Qudarat had left to the next generation seemed to be difficult for his successors to maintain. Having failed to learn lessons from history, after the Sultan's demise, the members of the ruling dynasties had developed rivalries among themselves that ended up with the weakening of their position against the Spaniards.

4.2 The American Colonization

To recall, at the onset of American colonization in the Moroland, the Sultan of Sulu welcomed the Americans. He entered into a peace treaty with the US. Thus, the American colonial project had penetrated almost unopposed. Consequently, some Bangsamoros, especially their leaders who had gone to American schools and saw opportunities and self-serving interests in cooperating with the Americans and their Filipino allies, never hesitated to work with the government that incorporated Moroland. As a reward for their cooperation, the government gave them positions both in local and national levels. But, they served, wittingly or unwittingly, to the furtherance of Moro integration or colonization.

For practical reason, the group who have realized the Americans' commitment to turn over the Moros into the future Filipino majority ruled the Philippine Republic, preferred to remain under American jurisdiction rather than to be subjects of the Filipinos. According to them, they could not trust the Filipino Christians because of what they perceived as inherent Christian antagonism against Islam and desire to grab the Moroland. In several instances, the said group requested from the colonial authorities in Manila and Washington to regard Moro people as different from the rest of the people of the archipelago and to grant them separate independence or retain them under American rule. On June 9, 1921, 57 prominent Moro leaders, including some foreigners, signed a petition letter addressed to the US President, declaring that "the people of Sulu desire that the Sulu Archipelago be made permanent American territory"

(Quoted in Gowing, 1987, 168.). In 1924, a group of Moro leaders, representing half a million Moros or so, sent a "Declaration of Rights and Purposes" to the US Congress, declaring their desire that "In the event that the United States grants independence to the Philippine Islands without provision for our retention under the American flag, it is our firm intention and resolve to declare ourselves an independent constitutional sultanate to be known to the world as the Moro nation"(Quoted in Gowing, 1987, 168.).

When the peaceful call for separateness of the Muslims was unheeded, another group of Muslims emerged and waged armed resistance to the American colonialist. Eventually, this became the dominant response of the Muslims to the western colonial project in the southern Philippines. In Sulu, Panglima Hassan led Suluanus and fought against the American forces in 1901 until he died in March 1904. In 1905, Datu Usap, also in Sulu, led a revolution against the American forces but also got killed (Gowing, 1987, 168). Due to the lack of unity among the Moros and superiority of the US military arsenal, the Americans always prevailed. To continue the struggle Panglima Hassan initiated, Datu Pala, Hassan's supporter who managed to slip away to Borneo returned to Jolo and declared jihad against the Americans. Like his compatriots, he was also brutally killed by the American soldiers. To sympathize with Datu Pala, his relatives, supporters and datus who supported him gathered and encamped in a mountain called Bud Dajo. To put the resistance down, about 790 American soldiers, armed with the most sophisticated weapons at the time, attacked the Moros' encampment mercilessly. The resistance ended with the brutal massacre of more than 600 Moros. It was one of the bloodiest fights that occurred during the military rule of Moro province under General Wood. (Gowing, 1987, 168).

In Lanao, the Maranaw fought the American forces in Lanao which culminated in the famous Battle of Bayang in May 1902. In 1917, the famous battle of Bayang had erupted when the Americans brutally attacked the Cota of Datu of Bayang, a Maranao, who defied the government by refusing to turn in their arms, to permit their children to attend public schools, or to allow officials to survey their land. Most of the dissidents, including the Datu, died in the said battle (Che Man, 1990, p. 51.).

In the Cotabato region, Datu Ali of Kudarangan led the resistance against the Americans. He was a Muslim chief who did not merely reject the American policy and hegemony, but also believed that the infidels would force Muslims to leave their Islamic way of life to embrace Christianity. In upper valley of Cotabato, Datu Ali organized and mobilized his followers, supporters, and sympathizers and declared jihad against the Americans. At first, he applied a conventional warfare tactic, but later on, he shifted to guerrilla tactics. In one of the fiercest

battles he fought, Datu Ali and no less than 100 of his men were all killed by the Americans in 1905 in an area called Simpetan (Gowing, 1987, 168). After Datu Ali's revolt, there was no efficiently organized and significant armed resistance activity against the Americans in the Cotabato region.

Datu Ambang of Kidapawan, now in North Cotabato province, gathered his people and invited several Datu to carry out jihad against the infidel Americans and Filipinos (Che Man, 1990, p. 52.). Against them, the Filipino soldiers with American support launched offensive operations and successfully rooted them out. The successful suppression of Moros led to the strengthening of the Department's grip on Mindanao and Sulu regions. The six-year US administration of Moroland under the Department of Mindanao and Sulu was a period of acceleration of Moro integration into a united, self-governing Philippines (Che Man, 1990, p. 52.).

In his analysis on the reasons why Moros' defeated against the military might and colonial cleverness of the Americans, Majul had perceptively observed that "Often, individual families took it upon themselves to fight American troops. But because individual influential sultans and Datus were given gifts, salaries, and flatteries, there was no united action against the Americans. And because of the Americans superiority in weapons- including their use of dum-dum bullets and the newly introduced .45 caliber pistol- they were able to gain sovereignty over the Muslim groups and to incorporate them into the American colony of the Philippines (Majul, 1985, pp. 20-1).

4.3 The Philippine Neo-colonization

4.3.1 Nationalist Armed Resistance

When the US granted independence to the Philippine Republic in 1946, some of the Moro leaders adopted pragmatism and worked with the government. Others who have realized the danger of government's policy of integration resented through non-violent protest and parliamentary means, while others pursued violent armed struggle. Threading the first path, Datu Ombra Amilbansa introduced in 1961 the Congress House Bill 5682 calling for the 'Granting and Recognizing the Independence of the Province of Sulu.' Although the Bill resulted in nothing as it the Congress failed to pass it, it expressed well the Muslims desire to be free from what they believed then as the Philippine colonial regime (Che Man, 1990, p. 60). On the other hand, Hadji Kamlon adopted a violent one when he declared jihad against the government. Although the two approaches did not succeed, they manifested Moros' resentment to their integration into the Filipino society (Che Man, 1990, p. 60).

In the 1960s, the majority of the Muslims perceived that they were undergoing tumult and oppression. In 1968, the Jabidah massacre which Muslims suspected to be perpetrated by the members of the Philippine armed forces, happened in the famed Corregidor Island. In 1971, about 65 Muslims- men, women, young and old were massacred inside a mosque in Barrio Manili, North Cotabato by the Ilagas whose army's support was imminent. This massacre is popularly known as the Manili Massacre. Other subsequent massacres and more bloody ones committed by the Ilagas happened during the war between government forces and the Moro forces in the early 1970s. Throughout these massacres, government forces' support was suspected as they happened virtually in the presence of the Philippine armed forces (Che Man, 1990, p. 60). Finally, in 1972, President Marcos declared Martial Law, which the Moros perceived as the government instrument for their systematic liquidation (Che Man, 1990, p. 76).

Responding to this challenge, the Moros rushed to organize armed resistance movement. Datu Udtog Matalam, the former Governor of the Empire Province of Cotabato, formed Muslim Independence Movement which he changed to Mindanao Independence Movement (MIM)] in 1969. Its "avowed objective was the creation of the Islamic Republic of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan" (Che Man, 1990, p. 61). When Datu Udtog Matalam surrendered, Congressman Rashid Lucman, an influential Muslim leader in Lanao region, together with other prominent Moro traditional leaders and politicians, organized the Bangsa Moro Islamic Liberation Organization (BMILO) in 1971. The BMILO arranged with Malaysian government the training of the "Top 90" who underwent training on guerrilla warfare in Malaysia. The BMILO, however, did not last long as some of its key leaders, including significant numbers of the trainees, surrendered to President Marcos' government even while they were still on their way back home (Buendia, 2010, pp. 228-9).

Disappointed by the way how the traditional politicians run the resistance movement, Nur Misuari, a nationalist, and Salamat Hashim, an Islamic reformer, took the challenge to carry on the Moro struggle. Together, they clandestinely organized the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the first organized Moro armed resistance movement against the Philippine neo-colonialism. In its manifesto, the MNLF stated that the objective of its revolutionary struggle was "to free ourselves from terror, oppression and tyranny of Filipino colonialism which caused us untold suffering and misery by criminally usurping our land, by threatening Islam through [wholesale] destruction and desecration of its places of worship and its Holy Book, and murdering our innocent brothers, sisters and old folks in a genocidal campaign of terrifying magnitude (Appended in Cesar A. Majul, 1985, p. 117).

To attain Bangsamoro independence, the MNLF espoused the necessity of revolutionary armed struggle to force the Philippine government to accede to the Moro demand. Since the declaration of Martial Law in 1972, until late 1976s, the MNLF armed wing had been the forerunner of the Moro armed resistance against the onslaught of the Philippine armed forces. With their organized movement, the MNLF armed wing had many times inflicted defeat upon its adversaries (Che Man, 1990, p. 80). Because of the MNLF's relatively successful military engagement with the Philippine armed forces and the bold support of some foreign Muslim sympathizers and leaders, the MNLF had brought new hope to the desperate Moro people, and with that hope, it had won the sympathy and support of the Moros. Due to this, the MNLF struggle subsequently became the converging point of the different sectors of the Bangsamoro society such as the idealist Moro professionals, the secular and Islamic oriented youth, and even some traditional politicians who, out of their disillusionment with their status as colonized people, wanted once again to be free from the clutches of colonial government.

But, when the MNLF, through the facilitation of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC), agreed to negotiate peace with the Philippine government within the bound of the Philippine constitution, the movement's unity began to break. That is why when it signed with the Philippine government the renowned Tripoli Agreement of 1976, in Tripoli Libya, whereby it compromised with the creation of an autonomous government for the Moro people within the framework of the Philippine constitution, some members of the MNLF leadership started to split away from the MNLF (Che Man, 1990, p. 84). Shaykh Salamat Hashim and his supporters, both from abroad and in Bangsamoro homeland, petitioned his takeover of the MNLF leadership. Salamat Hashim, in his capacity as the vice chair of the MNLF, was trying to convince Nur Misuari to stick to the original political objective of the MNLF that is a total liberation of the Moroland from Philippine colonialism or at least a genuine autonomy, and to adopt Islamic program, instead of following the model of communist revolution, to attain such goal. However, Nur Misuari was adamant and did not heed him. So, Salamat Hashim cut off his loyalty to Misuari's leadership and the MNLF in 1977. After it signed the Final peace agreement of 1996 with the Philippine government, the MNLF further disgruntled as some of its top brass commanders formed another MNLF factions, including the radical Abu Sayyaf.

4.3.2 Jihad: The Islamist Response

The most comprehensive Muslim response to the challenge of western colonialism in the Philippines is that of the Islamic liberation group of Shaykh Salamat Hashim. Hashim was a

prominent Islamic scholar trained in Al-Azhar University, Cairo, Egypt. Like the other Islamic revivalist thinkers, he saw Muslims in the Philippines as the subject of aggression, injustice, and oppression. Instead of blaming the Philippine government, he believed that the cause of the problem was nothing but the deviation of Muslims from right Islamic political line. According to him, this led to the decline of Muslim power and civilization. Thus, the Muslims became easy preys of colonizers (Hashim, 1999).

As a long-term solution, he called for the return of the Muslims to Islam as understood by the early Muslim predecessors and reestablishment of the Islamic power and civilization in the Moroland. He thus urged his fellow Muslims to strive to assert their right to self-determination because without it, he believed, the chance to reestablish the Islamic civilization, the leadership, and power of the Muslim Ummah is a remote possibility. Along with this line, he directed the Islamic movement towards the efforts to the revival of Islamic power and civilization, rebuilding the political structure of Islamic Ummah and its civilization in places out of the reach, influence, and control of the government like the MILF claimed controlled areas. According to him, this could be realized through the gradual liberation of Moroland and the implementation of the Islamic system of governance therein. To put this idea into practice, Hashim established MILF military and community camps in many strategic places in the Southern Philippines (Hashim, 1999).

According to Hashim, the major obstacle in the path towards achieving this goal is the crisis of the mind buffeting Muslims in the Southern Philippines. The crisis is an impact of centuries of Moro peoples' subjection to Western colonialism. This crisis, Hashim asserted, manifests in many forms like the existence of many complacent Bangsamoros who believe that Muslims could live under a non-Islamic government without their religion and belief system being affected. Also, there are some Bangsamoros who argue that the Islamic system of government is not applicable in the modern time and it has no match for the Western system of government; so, for them, Hashim claimed, there is no need to establish an Islamic government (Hashim, 1999).

Hashim stressed that these kinds of people are victims of the crisis of mind for they have become mentally retarded that they cannot be able to perceive the implications of even the simplest and the most obvious of things. To address this crisis, he stressed that one of the primary responsibilities of the Islamic movement is to liberate these people from the crisis of mind they are drowning in. Hashim believed that the Islamic revivalist movement should give equal importance to the liberation of the Muslims from the crisis of mind they are in. This can be

done through the establishment of an Islamic educational system that will serve as a means to cure the moral defeat and crisis of mentality of the Moros and to reset their way of thinking following the Islamic frame of thinking. The curriculum of this educational system should follow the model of the educational system that the prophet established and later developed by the righteous generations of the companions of the Prophet and their followers (Hashim, 1999).

Like the pioneering Islamic reformers, Hashim believed that the Islamic revivalist movement should use da'wah efficiently. Da'wah is to call people to embrace Islam as a complete way of life, to enjoin what is good and forbid what is wrong. In doing da'wah, there should be no other driving force except to attain success in this world and to gain the pleasure of Allah in the next world. According to him, a successful da'wah must possess some important features; it should be comprehensive and all-embracing. This means that da'wah should not concentrate only on addressing the spiritual aspects of Islam, but also the problems encountered by the Ummah, such as moral, political, cultural, intellectual, economic, social and the like. So, he believed that da'wah does not only aim at preaching Islam as a set of rituals, as others commonly believe but a problem-solving religion (Hashim, 1999).

According to Hashim (1999), a successful da'wah work must inform or teach the Muslims that Islam is not only for a certain people, but it is a universal religion, a religion and way of life for the entire humanity. Thus, as soon as they become Muslims, they become part of the global Muslim Ummah. Consequently, their tribal or national affiliation has to be sacrificed in favor of the global Muslim Ummah. All Muslims in the world, irrespective of color, race, tribe or nationality, are brothers and sisters in faith. They must bear in mind that they are not isolated from others. Thus, if other Muslims suffer, they must consider it theirs as well.

For Hashim, if the Muslims, like the case of the Moros, have no other alternative means to attain regain their rights, the Islamic movement should wage jihad (war). Salamat Hashim understood jihad as a comprehensive struggle in the way of Allah to make the words of Allah supreme. Its main objectives include the defense of the Muslims, their religion, land, honor, and dignity. He also believed that jihad involves any effort that may promote the cause of Islam like da'wah, bidding what is good and forbidding what is bad, saying the truth before a despotic leader, spending one's wealth, searching for knowledge that may benefit the humanity and others. It also means to fight in defense against persecution, oppression, injustice, and aggression. Jihad as a strategy to attain the objectives of Islamic revival is a comprehensive effort that aims at making the words of Allah supreme. Through these comprehensive work

strategies, Hashim believed that the Moros struggle to reestablish the power of Islam in Southern Philippines could be realized.

Based on this belief, Salamat Hashim and his associates like Khalifa Nando, Abu Khalil Yahya, Omar Pasigan, Alim Mimbantas, Abu Huraira Abdul-Rahaman and professionals like Murad Ibrahim, Ghazali Jaapar and Mohagher Iqbal to name the few, officially established the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in 1984 with an ultimate objective of not only liberation of the Moro homeland, but also the establishment of an Islamic system of government therein. The MILF Central Committee laid down the programs of the movement aiming for the achievement of its avowed goals. These programs included strengthening the organization, Islamization, military build-up and self-reliance. Until the death of Salamat Hashim in the year 2003, the observers considered MILF as one of the best organized Muslim armed resistance movements in the Muslim world, and the best in Southeast Asia. It had both political and military wings that covered the vast areas of Mindanao, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi. The post-Salamat Hashim MILF leadership continued the program that Salamat Hashim left. Presently, it engaged peace process with the Philippine government to find a political solution to the decades-old Moro problem with the Filipinos- a colonial legacy that had been adversely affecting for decades the relationship of the two nations.

5. Analysis

We have seen, thus far, from the foregoing discussion that throughout the period of Western colonialism in the Southern Philippines, the dominant response of Muslims was armed jihad or resistance. Although some of the Muslims collaborated with foreign colonialists, the majority of them vehemently resisted the Western colonial countries' attempts to colonize them. This kind of behavior, according to Muslim sociologist, is a natural reaction of people subjected to foreign aggression and colonization. For instance, Ibn Khaldun, a realist Muslim scholar, whose work, *The Muqaddimah*, Arnold Toynbee considered as the greatest product of human minds, affirmed this and expounded several centuries ago that "the origin of *harb* (war) is the human desire to take revenge on others (Quoted in Kopanski, 2003, p. 115). Based on this perspective, we can say that the armed resistance which the Muslims in the Southern Philippines waged against the western colonialism was no less than the natural reaction to the all-out war the Western colonialists waged against them.

The extent of the influence of Islam on Muslims' behavior towards the Western colonialism and legacies in the Southern Philippines is highly significant and so deeply rooted. It

was rooted from the principal source of Islamic principles. The Qur'an urged the Muslims to fight in the way of Allah who fight them. In the Qur'an, Allah says: "And fight in God's cause against those who wage war against you but do not commit aggression-for, verily, God does not love aggressors. And slay them wherever you may come upon them, and drive them away from wherever they drove you away – for oppression is even worse than killing. And fight not against them near the Inviolable House of Worship unless they fight against you there first; but if they fight against you, slay them: such shall be the recompense of those who deny the truth" (Qur'an, Surah al-Baqarah, 2:190-193).

Based on this passage from the Qur'an, Ibn Taymiyyah, another classical Islamic scholar, taught that "when the enemy initiates the war of aggression, the jihad becomes compulsory for every Muslim" (Kopanski, 2003, p. 102). That is why the Muslims in the Southern Philippines consider their recurrent armed resistance against foreign rules as a religious and moral obligation in Islam. Through this belief, they managed to sustain their resistance to foreign colonialism notwithstanding their minority status in their homeland. Therefore, one can safely say that as long as the Muslims feel that they are the object of foreign aggression, oppression, or colonization, they respond through all means, including armed jihad if there are no other options.

6. Conclusion

To conclude, Islam played a paramount role in shaping the Muslims' attitudes and responses to the challenge of western colonialism. The jihad as a dominant response of the Muslims to the Western colonialism in the Philippines was deeply rooted in the teachings of Islam. Islam served as the pillar and rallying point of their resistance against the foreign invaders. So, without Islam, the western colonial powers would have easily colonized the Muslims in the Southern Philippines similar to what have they done to the people of Luzon and Visayas. Hence, to address the present Bangsamoro and Filipino political issue, the researcher subscribes to the formula of late Hashim Salamat, which was echoed by Philippine President Duterte's administration that is the need to correct the historical injustices done against the Moros.

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